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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation examines the antecedents and consequences of exploration and 
exploitation in the context of strategic alliances. Research interest in the framework of 
exploration-exploitation has increased significantly with much progress made in current 
literature, yet many questions remain open. In this dissertation, I examine how environmental 
force (i.e., market uncertainty) and organizational features (i.e., innovative capacity and slack 
resources) drive organizations’ decisions on forming exploration versus exploitation alliances. In 
addition, I investigate the performance outcome of balancing exploration and exploitation 
alliances, by examining multiple approaches including the balance versus focus perspectives, the 
temporal separation approach, and the domain separation approach.  
 My study of the antecedents reveals that firms with higher innovative capacity are more 
likely to form more exploitation alliances than exploration alliances; in contrast, those with more 
slack resources are inclined to engage in more exploration alliances than exploitation alliances. 
Under market uncertainty, firms tend to be risk adverse and reduce forming both types of 
alliances. Furthermore, higher innovative capacity and more slack generally mitigate the 
negative impact of market uncertainty on alliance formation. My findings regarding performance 
outcome of exploration and exploitation alliances suggest that balancing them simultaneously 
may hurt performance. Instead, balance can be executed via temporal separation (i.e., balancing 
through sequential emphasis on exploration and exploitation over time), or domain separation 
(i.e., balance through focus on exploration in one domain while exploitation in another), which is 
particularly important for smaller firms. Organizational ambidexterity does benefit firm 
performance, given that it is achieved tactically. On the aggregate, my findings confirm that 
exploration and exploitation are in tension. Organizational features may trigger a firm’s choice 
between exploration and exploitation in diverse directions; superior performance tends to be 
more dependent on effective management of the tension. In Previous research, inconsistent 
conclusions have been drawn regarding the antecedents of exploration and exploitation, and few 
studies have demonstrated how balance between exploration and exploitation alliances generates 
favorable outcomes. I have examined both the antecedents and consequences of this framework 
in the context of strategic alliances, in hope of contributing to a more coherent and complete 
body of work on this phenomenon. 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Research Question 
One of the major concerns of corporate strategy is making choices about investing in 
different types of organizational activities  (He & Wong, 2004), which entail distinctive learning 
processes, management processes, and resource endowments. March (1991) proposed two sets of 
organizational behavior, exploration and exploitation, as two forms of learning activities. 
Organizations capable of integrating both exploration and exploitation are considered 
ambidextrous (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Accordingly, ambidextrous firms are capable of 
both efficiently exploiting existing competencies and skillfully exploring future opportunities 
without compromising each other (Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009; Simsek, 
2009). Since Duncan’s seminal work (1976) that suggests a dual-structure design to facilitate 
innovation in ambidextrous organizations, increasing attention has been paid to organizational 
ambidexterity in the literature of strategy and organizational theory (Kauppila, 2010). The 
application of this framework has now been extended to many disciplines and phenomena, such 
as knowledge management and innovation (He & Wong, 2004; Markman, Siegel, & Wright, 
2008; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996), organizational design (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; 
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen, van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005; Sheremata, 2000), 
organizational learning and adaptation (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Benner & Tushman, 2003; 
Gupta et al., 2006), and strategic management (Jansen, George, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 
2008; Lavie, Kang, & Rosenkopf, 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Smith & Tushman, 2005). 
Several scholars have reviewed the development of ambidexterity research in various disciplines 
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(e.g., Gupta et al., 2006; Lavie et al., 2010; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Simsek, 2009). Readers 
can refer to those review articles for an overview on this subject. Despite the amount of research 
devoted to this subject, ‘organizational ambidexterity remains an under-theorized, under-
conceptualized, and therefore, poorly understood phenomenon’ (Simsek, 2009: p. 598). What 
does organizational ambidexterity entail? Why and when do firms engage in exploration or 
exploitation? How does ambidexterity affect organizational outcome? There is still lack of clarity 
on the conceptualization, antecedents, and consequences of organizational ambidexterity. In this 
study, I examine organizational ambidexterity in the discipline of strategic management, in 
particular, strategic alliances. As an emerging area of research, alliance ambidexterity has 
received limited research efforts investigating its antecedents or consequences, with inconclusive 
and incomplete findings. Incorporating organizational learning perspective and the resource-
based view, this study examines both antecedents and performance consequences of exploration 
and exploitation alliances, attempting to contribute to the current literature by providing a more 
comprehensive model of exploration and exploitation in alliances. 
During the past decades, the business world has witnessed a growing population of 
alliances between firms (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007; Gulati, 1998). Particularly, in many high-
tech industries such as computer hard- and software, electronics, and pharmaceuticals, strategic 
alliances have become an essential part of firm strategy (Wassmer, 2010). Strategic alliances can 
be viewed as a type of corporate strategic choice employed by firms in response to changes in 
organizational and environmental contexts (Park et al., 2002). Koza and Levin (1998) laid the 
ground work of distinguishing between exploration and exploitation alliances by considering 
whether alliance activity is motivated by the need to explore for new opportunities or to exploit 
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known knowledge and capabilities. The theoretical lens of exploration-exploitation has been 
applied in the literature of strategic alliances (e.g., Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Yamakawa, Yang, & Lin, 2011), and is calling for 
more research attention (Lavie et al., 2010). First, there has been scant attempt to uncover why 
organizations pursue exploration versus exploitation alliances, among which empirical research 
has produced limited or mixed evidences (Danneels & Sethi, 2011; Lavie et al., 2010). Second, 
research on the performance implications of exploration and exploitation alliances has been 
sparse. In particular, the vast majority of previous research focuses on exploration versus 
exploitation in the domain of R&D and innovation, with few exceptions investigating other 
domains (Lavie et al., 2011). A more comprehensive model incorporating the antecedents and 
consequences of exploration versus exploitation alliances has not been attempted in previous 
literature. Given the gaps in current research, this dissertation aims to answer the following 
questions:  
What are the antecedents of exploration and exploitation alliance formation? What 
are the performance implications of exploration and exploitation alliances within and 
across different domains?  
Given that the framework of exploitation-exploration has been broadly applied, scholars 
may form distinctive interpretations of this framework while studying different contexts. It is 
suggested that the application and interpretation of this framework shall be treated with caution 
(Lavie et al., 2010). Therefore, it is important to define the context and boundary of studies on 
exploration and exploitation (Gupta et al., 2006). Prior research has conceptualized the twin 
concepts from different perspectives, including whether the alliances focus on upstream or 
4 
 
downstream activities along the value chain (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), whether the alliances 
involve learning from new or existing partners (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004), or 
whether the alliances entail learning from partners with various organizational attributes (Lavie 
& Rosenkopf, 2006). In this study, I investigate alliance ambidexterity in the setting of U.S. 
high-technology industries and build my arguments and analyses based on previous research 
with similar contexts (e.g., Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Following 
the domain approach proposed by Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006), I focus on two domains: 
function-based and structure-based domains. In the function-based domain, alliance activities 
that aim at exploring new competencies and new opportunities in the upstream of the value chain 
are considered as exploration alliances, whereas those formed to exploit existing competencies 
and to leverage known opportunities in the downstream of the value chain are referred to as 
exploitation alliances. In the structure domain, I focus on whether the partner is an old one or a 
new one in the year of alliance formation. An alliance is structure exploratory when it is a new 
partner that the focal firm has never formed alliances with before, and structure exploitative 
otherwise. Embracing the theoretical framework of exploration and exploitation (March 1991), 
in the following sections of this dissertation, I first present the literature review and define the 
assumptions and boundary of exploration and exploitation alliances, following Lavie and 
Ronsenkopf’s (2006) domain approach. Second, I investigate the antecedents of exploration and 
exploitation alliances by including the environmental and organizational factors to untangle the 
mechanisms that affect the choice of exploration and exploitation in alliance formation. Third, I 
examine the performance implication of balancing exploration and exploitation alliances within 
and across domains (See Figure 1 for the theoretical framework).  
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1.2 Literature Review 
 March (1991) proposed two forms of organizational behavior, exploration and 
exploitation, to distinguish between two fundamentally different learning activities. Activities 
involving “refinement, efficiency, selection, and implementation” are associated with 
exploitation, whereas those including “search, variation, experimentation, and discovery” are 
referred to as exploration (March, 1991: p. 71).  Since his foundational work, there has been a 
proliferation of subsequent research in different literature streams employing the framework of 
exploitation-exploration, and the scope of application has been greatly extended after two 
decades (Lavie et al., 2010; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Organizational ambidexterity has now 
become an emerging research paradigm in organizational theory (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & Souder, 2009). Strategic alliances, as one of the contexts recently 
incorporating this framework, “have become a noteworthy vehicle for exploration and 
exploitation” (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006: p. 798), calling for more research attention (Lavie et 
al., 2010). Table 1 provides a summary of selected recent studies in this area.  
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Table 1 Review of Selected Studies on Exploration-Exploitation Alliances 
Study Theoretical Lens 
Conceptual 
Handling of 
EX/EI 
Alliances 
Empirical 
Handling of EX/EI 
Alliances 
 
Focus 
Method Key Findings 
Beckman et 
al.  (2004) 
Social network 
perspective 
Structure 
Counts of alliances 
with new/existing 
partners 
Antecedents 
3,333 alliances 
between 240 service 
and industrial firms 
between 1998-1992 
Firms reinforce its alliance 
network through past partners 
under market uncertainty 
Hoang & 
Rothaermel 
(2010) 
Organizational 
learning 
Function 
Percentage of 
upstream/downstrea
m alliances of the 
value chain 
Consequences  
412 R&D projects in 
biotechnology 
conducted by large 
pharmaceutical 
companies between 
1980 and 2000 
Alliance exploitation 
experience has positive effects 
on R&D project performance, 
while alliance exploration 
experience has negative 
effects 
Kauppila 
(2010) 
Ambidextrous 
context 
Structural separation 
 
Function 
Examples of 
alliance activities in 
upstream/downstrea
m of the value 
chain 
Consequences  
In-depth field 
investigation of a 
medium-sized firm in 
Finland 
Ambidextrous organizational 
context enables a firm to reap 
the benefits of exploration and 
exploitation partnerships 
Lavie et al. 
(2011) 
Organizational 
learning 
Tension view 
Function 
Structure 
 
 Percentage of 
exploration/exploita
tion alliances in 
each domain 
Consequences 
 
2,587 firm-year 
observations of US-
based firms in the 
software-industry 
from 1990-2002 
Balance within domains is 
disadvantageous. Balance 
across domains increases 
performance.  
Increase in firm size reinforces 
both relationships. 
Lavie and 
Rosenkopf 
(2006) 
Absorptive capacity 
Organizational 
inertia 
Function 
Structure 
Attribute 
Percentage of 
exploration/exploita
tion alliances in 
each domain 
Antecedents  
19,928 alliances 
formed by U.S. 
software firms from 
1990 to 2001 
Path dependency reinforces 
exploration/exploitation in 
each domain; firms balance 
them over time and across 
domains. 
Li et al. 
(2008) 
Organizational 
learning 
TCE 
Structure 
Counts of alliances 
with new/existing 
partners 
Antecedents 
1,159 R&D alliances 
between high-tech 
firms during 1994-
2003 
Firms prefer ‘friend’ partners 
when alliances’ innovation 
goals are radical 
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Lin et al. 
(2007) 
RDT 
Social network 
perspective 
Structure 
Alliance 
ambidexterity as a 
categorical variable 
based on the 
exploration index 
Consequences 
282 alliances formed 
by 95 U.S. firms from 
1988 to 1995; 
Simulation model 
Alliance ambidexterity 
benefits large firms and in 
uncertain environment, 
focused strategy benefits small 
firms and in stable 
environment.  
Park et al. 
(2002) 
RDT 
Strategic behavior 
view 
RBV 
Function 
 
Counts of 
upstream/downstrea
m alliances of the 
value chain 
Antecedents  
171 U.S. 
semiconductor start-
ups; 471 alliances 
between 1979 and 
1989 
Resource-rich firms are more 
likely to form alliances in 
volatile markets; resource-
poor firms become more 
active in stable markets. 
Rothaermel & 
Deeds (2004) 
Organizational 
learning 
RBV 
Function 
 
Counts of 
upstream/downstrea
m alliances of the 
value chain 
Antecedents & 
Consequences  
2565 alliances 
formed by 325 
biotechnology firms 
between 1973 and 
1997. 
An integrated product 
development path from 
exploration alliances to 
products in development, to 
exploitation alliances, to 
products on the market.  
Yamakawa et 
al. (2011) 
RBV 
Relational 
perspective 
Function 
Structure 
 
 Exploration 
alliance ratio Consequences   
95 firms from five 
industries over eight 
years (1988 – 1995) 
The analyses reveal the 
importance of organizational, 
strategic, and environmental 
fit in relation to a firm’s 
alliance portfolio and its 
performance consequences. 
Yang et al. 
(2014) 
Alliance benefits & 
risks 
Function 
 
Counts of 
upstream/downstrea
m alliances of the 
value chain 
Consequences 
 
753 firm-year 
observations of 
alliances between 
small U.S. biotech 
firms and large 
pharmaceutical firms 
from 1984 to 2006 
Exploitation alliances with 
large firms generate higher 
values for small firms than 
exploration alliances with 
large firms due to a 
heightened risk of 
appropriation in exploration 
alliances. 
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1.2.1 Organizational Exploration and Exploitation: Conceptualization 
            In their review article, Gupta et al. (2006) discussed four related questions of the 
interplay between exploration and exploitation, starting from the clarity of their definitions. They 
presented two streams of definitions in previous literature regarding how to distinguish between 
exploration and exploitation: one stream of research focuses on the differences in the type of 
learning, the other on the presence versus the absence of learning. They argued that the logic of 
original work by March (1991) leads to the former approach of definition. All activities, be it 
exploration or exploitation, include at least some degree of learning. Even when it engages in 
replication of past actions, an organization experiences a certain level of learning accumulation, 
although in an incremental manner (Gupta et al., 2006).  Accordingly, it is more logical to 
consider the type or amount of learning to differentiate between exploration and exploitation, 
which is the logic employed in this study. Learning in exploitation activities is generally 
incremental and improvement-oriented, whereas learning in exploration activities is typically 
radical and experiment-oriented. Built upon this fundamental definition of exploitation and 
exploration, recent studies have applied this theoretical lens to various contexts and examined 
exploitation and exploration in vastly diversified subjects, including (but not limited to) known 
and new versus internal and external knowledge/ technology applications (Fang et al., 2010; 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Im & Rai, 2008; Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009; Wagner, 2011; 
Zhou & Wu, 2010), product development to cater existing or new customers/markets (Jansen et 
al., 2012; Piao, 2010), alignment and adaptability of organizational management systems 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), new product development and design (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 
2009; Boumgarden et al., 2012; Cao et al., 2009; Danneels & Sethi, 2011; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & 
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Voss, 2008), exploitation or exploration orientation in organizational activities (Uotila, Maula, 
Keil, & Zahra, 2009), and exploitation alliances versus exploration alliances (Beckman et al., 
2004; Kauppila, 2010; Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin, Yang, & Demirkan, 
2007; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Yamakawa et al., 2011). The specific activity examined in 
each study is recognized as the application of this lens in a particular context. Various 
approaches in both technical and social contexts have been adopted to distinguish between 
exploitation and exploration (Rosenkopf & McGrath, 2011). Given such a wide span of 
application, empirical findings in prior research have been inconclusive and sometimes even 
inconsistent. The objective of this study is not to reconcile the contradictory findings of 
exploration-exploitation research across all fields, if possible. Instead, it is argued that context-
specific characteristics play an important role in shaping the mechanisms of exploitation and 
exploration (Gupta et al., 2006). Thus it is of importance to clearly lay out the setting of research, 
before digging into further details.  
            The research setting of this study is exploration and exploitation alliances in high-
technology industries. Previous research studying exploitation and exploration alliances has 
taken different approaches. Koza and Lewin (1998) are among the first to theorize exploitation 
and exploration alliances. They integrated March’s framework in this context and conceptually 
discussed the distinctive features of exploitation and exploration alliances. According to them, 
firms may form alliances to exploit an existing capability or to explore new opportunities. As 
such, the value chain function of the alliances (e.g., leveraging existing capability or developing 
new opportunities) serves as the key to distinguish them. As mentioned before, exploration and 
exploitation differ in the type or amount of knowledge entailed. In the inter-organizational 
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context, firms that engage partners in upstream activities such as R&D are likely to develop new 
knowledge which eventually leads to innovative technologies; in contrast, firms that establish 
alliances engaging in downstream activities such as commercialization and marketing tend to 
leverage and combine partners’ existing knowledge and capabilities (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; 
Rothaermel 2001). As such, “the distinction between acquiring and generating new knowledge 
through exploration and accessing, integrating, and implementing existing knowledge through 
exploitation has been linked to firms’ polar tendencies to engage in R&D alliances [upstream] 
versus marketing alliances [downstream]” (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006: p. 799). Specifically, if an 
alliance involves a new knowledge-generating agreement such as R&D, technology co-
development, or new product co-development, it is considered an exploration alliance; if an 
alliance involves an agreement based on combining and integrating existing knowledge, such as 
product testing, clinical trials, joint marketing, original equipment manufacturer, or licensing, it 
is viewed as an exploitation alliance (Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014). It is important to note 
that, although there is likely to be a certain degree of overlap between these two kinds of 
alliances, a distinction is whether developing exploratory new knowledge and relatively 
uncertain technology is the focus of alliances. Especially in high-technology industries, alliances 
driven by commercialization needs (e.g., product marketing) involves, for instance, the 
technology venture’s exploiting its current technologies and the partner’s leveraging its existing 
marketing capabilities. Whereas in exploration alliances such as R&D ones, firms undertake 
exploratory search in an attempt to discover new knowledge/technology. There is likely to be 
new knowledge generated in the former type of alliances; however, the pattern of knowledge 
flows underlying firms’ knowledge bases in the latter type of alliances is generally more 
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exploratory (Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014). A dichotomy of exploration and exploitation 
alliances based on the value chain function has been prevalently and overwhelmingly adopted in 
subsequent empirical research (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Kauppila, 2010; Lavie et al., 2011; 
Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Park et al., 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Yamakawa et al., 2011; 
Yang et al. 2014). For example, as presented in Table 1, Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) examined 
the biotechnology industry and classified alliances that engage in the upstream activities of the 
value chain as exploration alliances, whereas alliances that focus on the downstream activities of 
the value chain as exploitation alliances. Kauppila (2010) conducted an in-depth field 
investigation and coded alliance activities in upstream or downstream of the value chain as 
exploration or exploitation partnerships. Ranganathan and Rosenkopf (2014) examined the 
voting behavior of technological standards in computer industry and considered knowledge 
network of R&D alliances exploratory and commercialization network of alliances focusing on 
downstream activities exploitative. In the same vein, Park et al. (2002) studied the semiconductor 
industry and divided alliances into exploration and exploitation ones based on the upstream 
activities (e.g., joint R&D) and downstream activities (e.g., manufacturing, marketing, and 
technology-licensing) of the value chain. Current literature examining the function of alliances in 
technical context tends to exhibit convergence on this line of conceptualizing and 
operationalizing exploration and exploitation alliances.   
 Meanwhile, another stream of research in strategic alliances has been studying the social 
characteristics of alliance partners (e.g., Beckman et al., 2004; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008). 
A number of studies have been devoted to investigating alliance partner choices, with a small 
portion adopting the exploitation-exploration framework. In the form of social context, the 
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relationships themselves are considered as learning activities (Kogut and Zander 1992) to 
distinguish between exploration and exploitation alliances which are evaluated with respect to 
the pre-existing partnerships. Beckman et al. (2004), for instance, regard forming alliances with 
new partners as a form of exploration, whereas entering alliances with existing partners as a form 
of exploitation. As shown in Table 1, several studies have employed this structure domain to 
study exploration and exploitation alliances (e.g., Beckman et al., 2004; Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie 
& Rosenkopf, 2006; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; Lin et al. 2007; Yamakawa et al., 2011). It 
is considered that firms have developed routines of governance and have been exposed to each 
other’s knowledge when working with repeat partners. In this regard, they experience less 
novelty. In contrast, collaborating with new partners entails a high level of novelty of all relevant 
issues (Rosenkopf & McGrath, 2011). Firms may expand their knowledge and access to 
resources through new alliance partners as a form of exploration, and extend their current 
knowledge base with existing alliance partners as a form of exploitation (Beckman et al. 2004). 
Forming exploration alliances by searching for partners beyond a firm’s local network can 
potentially broaden its reach and seek new knowledge, offering new opportunities with a certain 
level of uncertainty and risk; in contrast, when firms form recurrent alliances with existing 
partners, prior experience and inter-firm trust facilitate the exploitation of current knowledge 
base and enhance the predictability and reliability of collaboration (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). 
As such, March’s (1991) notion of exploration-exploitation corresponds to the structure 
dimension of alliance formation, which is conceptually different from the function dimension of 
exploration-exploitation alliances discussed above. Given the conceptualization multiplicity of 
the exploitation-exploration construct in strategic alliances which may lead to mixed empirical 
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evidences and interpretations, Lavie et al. (2006) proposed a domain approach by identifying 
three domains of exploration-exploitation in alliance formation: the function domain which 
focuses on the value chain function of the alliance, the structure domain which looks at whether 
the alliance partner is a new partner or a recurrent one, and the attribute domain which  pertains 
to the variance in organizational attributes of a firm’s partners. Indeed, current research of 
exploitation-exploration in alliance formation have studied one of the domains separately, but 
rarely examined them simultaneously. It is of importance to bear in mind the examined domain 
of each study when interpreting its findings on the one hand, and to conduct more research 
examining multiple domains for further understanding of this phenomenon on the other hand.  
            In addition to the different views in conceptualization and operationalization of the 
constructs per se, a variety of perspectives have been employed by scholars to address the 
balance and dynamics between exploration and exploitation (Rosenkopf & McGrath, 2011). 
Although March (1991) emphasized the necessity of a balance between exploration and 
exploitation for long-run adaptation, theorization of such a balance varies across different studies. 
One typical debate is whether exploration and exploitation shall be regarded as competing 
behaviors at two ends of a continuum or shall be interpreted as orthogonal dimensions (Gupta et 
al., 2006; Rosenkopf & McGrath, 2011). Scholars who theorize exploitation and exploration as 
opposing ends of a continuum basically acknowledge the fundamental conflict and 
incompatibility between the two behaviors. As argued by March (1991), exploitation and 
exploration are at odds because they compete for scarce resources, tend to be self-reinforcing and 
to drive each other out, and entail conflicting routines to carry out. In this regard, balancing 
between exploitation and exploration translates into effective management of the conflicts and 
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tension between the two activities. Many previous studies explicitly or implicitly assume this line 
of logic to build the arguments. For example, Uotila et al. (2009) grounded their argument on 
March’s assumption and viewed exploitation and exploration as a continuous spectrum. They 
employed a quite unique approach by analyzing the news documents of 279 manufacturing firms 
between 1989 and 2004 to derive their exploitation versus exploration orientation. The authors 
posited that a balance between exploitation and exploration involves trade-offs between them 
and firms are pressured to take such trade-offs into account. In a similar vein, Lavie et al. (2011) 
examined exploitation and exploration alliances in multiple domains and theorized that within 
each domain, exploitation and exploration alliances “are often at odds, requiring firms to manage 
trade-offs when pursuing these activities simultaneously” (p.1520). They proposed that firm 
performance will be negatively related to a balance between exploration and exploitation of 
alliance formation decisions within domains. In contrast, other scholars take a different approach 
and consider exploitation and exploration as orthogonal dimensions which could positively 
interact with each other (e.g., Katila & Ahuja, 2002). In this sense, organizational ambidexterity 
does not necessarily mandate a trade-off but rather could be achieved by organizations 
simultaneously and successfully (Rosenkopf & McGrath, 2011). Scholars adopting the 
orthogonality perspective put emphasis on the synergy of exploration and exploitation as well as 
the potential for mutual reinforcement between the two activities. Cao et al. (2009), for instance, 
argue that firms should not only balance exploitation and exploration by simultaneously pursuing 
both activities, they should also parallel such a balance with a high level of combined magnitude 
of exploitation and exploration in order to generate synergistic benefits. Similarly, in their study 
examining the structure-based domain of exploitation and exploration alliance formation, Lin et 
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al. (2007) argued for a positive impact of an ambidextrous formation of both types of alliances, 
which is akin to acknowledging the orthogonal nature of exploitation and exploration.  
            At first sight, continuity or orthogonality may pose as competing views. Indeed, it has 
been acknowledged that March’s assumption of fundamental incompatibility between 
exploitation and exploration is difficult to dispute and many empirical evidences have lent 
support to his logic. However, Gupta et al. (2006) suggested that context plays an important role 
in the resolution. As a matter of fact, empirical studies supporting either continuity or 
orthogonality are generally contingent upon certain conditions, which include, for example, 
resource scarcity manifested by firm size (Lavie et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2007) or organizational 
slack (Voss et al., 2008), organizational capability to create ambidextrous context (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010), and the domain setting examined. It is 
acknowledgeable that under different contextual conditions, the tensions and trade-offs between 
exploitation and exploration may be relaxed or circumvented. When resources are scarce, 
organizational capability is limited in managing ambidexterity, or the unit of analysis is treated 
as a single domain setting, exploitation and exploration are generally mutually exclusive and 
compete against each other. To the contrary, in organizations that have munificent resources, 
possess the capacity of managing ambidexterity, or encompass multiple loosely coupled domains, 
exploitation and exploration could be orthogonal and coexist in high levels (Rosenkopf & 
McGrath, 2011). In addition to the contextual conditions, I argue that static versus dynamic 
perspectives on ambidexterity also account for the dynamism between exploitation and 
exploration (Raisch et al., 2009). A static or dynamic perspective may allow different 
observations of the interaction between the two activities. In particular, a dynamic perspective 
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could uncover more orthogonal nature of exploitation and exploration, and potentially provide 
scholars a window to investigate the synergy between the two. Several recent empirical studies 
have taken such a perspective and advocated their complementarity as well as synergistic fusion. 
Piao (2010) analyzed the hard disk drive industry from 1980 to 1999 and suggested that a 
moderate level of temporal overlap between an exploration process and an exploitation process 
facilitates a firm’s longevity. He posited that exploitation and exploration are two interdependent 
and complementary processes: exploration may depend on exploitation for resource supply, 
whereas exploitation may rely on exploration for sources of exploitation. A temporal approach 
could demonstrate the alignment of exploitation and exploration. Boumgarden et al. (2012) 
examined two canonical cases and found that compared to a static balance in lower levels of 
exploitation and exploration, a dynamic approach of organizational vacillation help create higher 
levels of both exploration and exploitation, thus higher performance. Whether a static or a 
dynamic approach is employed to examine organizational ambidexterity may reveal different 
aspects of the dynamism between the two activities. Overall, I posit that the fundamental tension 
and trade-off do exist between exploitation and exploration. Meanwhile, there is also a 
dimension for complementarity and synergy. The contextual conditions and research approach 
employed in each study could influence the corresponding findings. An integration of both the 
tension view and the complementarity perspective would enrich our understanding.  
 
1.2.2 Antecedents of Exploration and Exploitation  
            As discussed above, both inherent tension and potential synergy reside in the relationship 
between exploitation and exploration. Given such complexity, it is still unclear that what factors 
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trigger these contradictory yet possibly complementary activities (Lavie et al., 2010). There have 
been limited research endeavors devoted to uncover why some organizations pursue exploration 
while others favor exploitation. Among these endeavors, previous studies have mainly focused 
on two categories of antecedents: environmental factors (e.g., environmental uncertainty, 
exogenous shocks, and competitive intensity) and organizational characteristics (e.g., 
organization size, slack resources, absorptive capacity). An organization’s tendency to explore 
versus exploit could be affected by a variety of factors. However, empirical evidences to date 
have produced limited and mixed results regarding the causes of exploration and exploitation. 
There hasn’t been any consensus reached yet.  
Environmental approaches of exploitation versus exploration alliance formation 
            Organization theory and industrial economics literature have suggested the role of 
external environmental forces in affecting a firm’s search strategy (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 
1984; Porter, 1981). The sociological perspective also examines a diffuse set of social, political 
and cultural pressures in studying organizations (Fligstein & Freeland, 1995). Lavie et al. (2010) 
provide an overview of environmental antecedents of exploitation and exploration. They 
discussed that previous studies have paid attention to examine several aspects of environmental 
factors including environmental dynamism, exogenous shocks, competitive intensity, and 
appropriability regime. Systematic differences across industries, such as environmental 
dynamism and exogenous shocks, tend to affect a firm’s strategic choice toward exploration or 
exploitation (Lavie et al., 2010; Wang & Li, 2008). For example, unpredictable change of market 
demand often renders existing products and services obsolete (Jansen, Van den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2006; Lavie et al., 2010). Institutional pressures such as the change of regulation could 
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also influence a firm’s tendencies of exploration and exploitation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Firms need to explore new opportunities in order to keep updated and adapted with the changing 
environment (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Wang & Li, 2008). Some scholars have treated 
environmental dynamism as an effect moderating the impact of other factors. Danneels and Sethi 
(2011) analyzed data from 145 U.S. public manufacturing firms and examined how the 
turbulence of the customer, competitive and technological environments in those industries 
affects organizational propensity to explore. They found that a firm’s tendency to explore new 
products driven by organizational factors is contingent on the turbulence in different sectors of 
its environment. Voss et al. (2008) looked into 214 non-profit professional theaters and 
suggested that when perceived environmental threat is high, organizations tend to shift to higher 
levels of exploration and lower levels of exploitation. The type of environmental factors, the 
operationalization of these constructs, and the contexts examined in previous research vary 
across different studies. Lavie et al (2010) concluded that very few factors have been shown to 
empirically produce consistent effects on driving organization’s inclination to explore versus 
exploit. As such, it is suggested that we need to be cautious about generalizing the interpretation 
of prior empirical evidences.   
 This study pays particular attention to the antecedents of exploration and exploitation 
alliances. Despite the increasing amount of research on organizations’ exploration and 
exploitation propensity, there has been little attempt to uncover what triggers organizations’ 
tendency to explore versus exploit in the practices of alliance formation (Danneels & Sethi, 
2011; Lavie et al., 2010). Table 1 presents representative studies examining the antecedents of 
exploration and exploitation alliances. Few studies have investigated the role of environmental 
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turbulence as an antecedent of exploration versus exploitation alliance formation (Kim & Rhee, 
2009). Existing empirical research analyzing environmental forces that drive exploration versus 
exploitation in the context of strategic alliances has generated divergent evidences. Theoretical 
argumentation regarding the impact of environmental forces on exploration versus exploitation 
generally advocates that turbulent and dynamic environment requires organizations to explore 
whereas stable and unfluctuating environment nurtures exploitation (e.g., Jansen et al., 2006; 
Sidhu, Volberda, & Commandeur, 2004). However, research in the context of strategic alliances 
tends to suggest the impact of environmental forces in the other direction. Beckman and her 
colleagues (2004), for instance, studied both interlock and alliance networks of 300 largest U.S. 
firms during the 1988-1993 period and found that the higher the level of market uncertainty, the 
more likely a firm is to reinforce its networks through establishing more exploitation alliances in 
order to manage exogenous uncertainty. Li et al. (2008) argued that in a turbulent technological 
environment, firms tend to prefer forming alliances with ‘friends’ they trust, essentially, in order 
to rely on the exploitation of existing alliance partnerships. In this regard, both studies tend to 
converge on the opinion that organizations tend to favor exploitation alliances in uncertain 
environments.  
The interesting yet inconsistent insights offered by previous studies could be attributed to 
the variety in conceptualizations of the exploration-exploitation constructs. Studies examining 
exploration-exploitation have dramatically different focuses. For example, Jansen et al. (2006) 
looked at exploratory and exploitative innovations and found that firms tended to pursue 
exploratory innovation in dynamic environment. Sidhu et al. (2004) focused on the dimension of 
information acquisition to distinguish between exploration and exploitation and suggested that 
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environmental dynamism lead to information exploration. These studies generally suggest that 
dynamic environment leads to the pursuit of exploration, however, within organizational 
boundary. Beckman et al. (2004), however, focused on the structure-based domain of alliance 
formation and defined forming alliances with similar and familiar partners as exploitation 
alliances whereas forming alliances with new partners was considered as exploration alliance. 
They reported that organizations might form exploitation alliances to reduce market uncertainty. 
Similarly, Li et al. (2008) examined alliance partner selection by categorizing the partners into 
friends, acquaintances, and strangers. The findings suggest that uncertain environment stimulates 
exploitation. However, these studies focus on the boundary-spanning mechanisms of alliances 
and consider recurrent partnerships as exploitation. It does not exclude the possibility that firms 
engage in recurrent partnerships to explore new technology or products, neither does it exclude 
the possibility of these firms’ endeavors of pursuing internal exploration. The variety of 
conceptualizations has yielded distinctive prescriptions which may not be mutually exclusive to 
each other, on which we should cautiously draw conclusion. It is therefore suggested that we 
tailor the conceptualization and argument to the specific phenomenon so that valuable analogies 
can be drawn between similar phenomena (Lavie et al., 2010).  
Organizational approaches of alliance formation 
Scholars have pointed out that, besides environmental conditions as external stimuli, 
internal organizational features play a role in influencing firms’ decisions of exploration and 
exploitation (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). According to previous research, organizational 
antecedents differentially influence organizations’ exploration and exploitation activities (Jansen 
et al., 2006; Wang & Li, 2008). Organizational characteristics, routines, and capabilities differ 
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from one organization to another, as they evolve along their own idiosyncratic trajectories 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Wang & Li, 2008). Due to such path-dependency, organizations 
develop distinct routines and knowledge bases which affect their ability to process information 
and to understand the signals about the opportunities available in the environment, leading to 
various strategic responses (Wang & Li, 2008).  Therefore, internal organizational features are 
argued to substantially influence a firm’s strategic actions.   
 However, there has been little systematic evidence on whether certain organizational 
features lead to exploratory or exploitative search so far (Jansen et al., 2006). For instance, 
studies examining organizational slack have generated mixed results (Lavie et al., 2010). Some 
scholars suggest that slack resource facilitates risk taking and innovation because it allows firms 
to engage in activities such as search and experimentation by cushioning environmental 
fluctuations and downside risks (Greve, 2007; Lavie et al., 2010). Exploratory activities are thus 
encouraged. Other scholars, in contrast, argue that slack resource discourages organizations from 
exploration because firms may rely on consuming current slack resources to sustain their 
performance objectives rather than continuously look for new opportunities (Lavie et al., 2010). 
Curvilinear effect is also suggested in the literature as a reconciliation of the opposing views 
(Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Some scholars further decompose slack resources into multiple 
dimensions and posit that different types of slack resources may have distinctive impact on 
organizations’ exploitation versus exploration choices. Voss et al. (2008) look at how slack 
resources interact with environmental threat appraisal to influence product exploration and 
exploitation. The authors argue that slack resources should be further investigated based on the 
dimensions of rarity and absorption. Accordingly, they categorize slack resources into financial 
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slack, operational slack, customer relational slack, and human resource slack. Based on a survey 
of non-profit professional theaters in the U.S., this article finds that the choice of product 
exploration versus exploitation depends on the extent to which a resource is rare and absorbed in 
operations, and the extent of perceived environmental threats. In particular, absorbed, generic 
resources are associated with increased exploitation and decreased exploration. Unabsorbed 
resources result in higher exploration and lower exploitation when perceived environmental 
threat is high. The authors suggested that firms make pragmatic decisions to ‘balance the benefits 
of superior strategic position against the risks of jeopardizing viability’ (p. 147).  
 Inconsistent results are also found when scholars examine the impact of organizational 
factors on choices between exploration versus exploitation in alliance formation (Lavie et al., 
2010). A variety of organizational factors have been investigated in previous research in attempt 
to uncover their impact on exploitation-exploration orientation, including firm size (Beckman et 
al., 2004; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), firm-specific uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004), dyad-
specific factors such as technological relatedness, technological capability, and radicalness of 
alliance’s innovation goals (Bierly, Damanpour, & Santoro, 2009; Li et al., 2008), as well as the 
interaction between exploitation and exploration alliances themselves (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 
2006; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). For example, diverging results have been suggested 
regarding the influence of firm size on its propensity to explore versus exploit in alliance 
formation. The tendency to engage in exploitation alliances was found to increase as firm size 
increases because of increased organizational inertia and path-dependency (Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004). To the contrary, larger firms are argued to form more exploration alliances due to 
their better access to internal resources (Beckman et al., 2004). Other studies, however, did not 
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find significant association between size and exploration alliances (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; 
Sidhu et al., 2004). It is worth noting that these studies tend to focus on different domains of 
alliance formation. Beckman et al. (2004) looked at the structure-based domain and distinguished 
exploration from exploitation by new versus prior partners, whereas Rothaermel and Deeds 
(2004) considered an alliance exploratory or exploitative by looking at whether it was formed for 
R&D or commercialization purposes. Lavie et al. (2006), nevertheless, encompass multiple 
domains together in their research.  
 Another factor, technological capacity is examined in both internal and external 
exploitation and exploration, although not in the context of exploration and exploitation 
alliances. Zhou and Wu (2010) examine the role of technological capability in product 
innovation based on absorptive capacity perspective and organizational inertia theory. By testing 
the hypotheses on 192 firms from high-tech industries in China, the authors found that 
technological capability fosters internal exploitation at an accelerating rate and has an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with exploration. Besides, greater technological capability is associated 
with more exploration innovation when strategic flexibility is high. In contrast, Bierly et al. 
(2009) examined the collaboration between firms and university research centres and looked at 
how firms applied external knowledge in product exploitation versus exploration. Their findings 
suggested that high level of technological capability tends to benefit both product exploitation 
and exploration when the knowledge transferred is tacit.  
 A limited amount of studies have shed light on the dynamics between exploitation and 
exploration alliances to untangle the interaction between these two activities. Rothaermel and 
Deeds (2004) studied 325 biotechnology firms over a 25-year period to examine the causal 
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relationship between strategic alliances and new product development. They suggested an 
integrated product development path where exploration alliances generate more products in 
development, and in turn lead to more exploitation alliances in order to push them towards 
markets. Rooted in the literature of absorptive capacity and organizational inertia, the work of 
Lavie et al. (2006) investigated alliances formed by U.S. software firms spanning the years 1990 
to 2001. They found that due to path dependence, prior experience in exploration/exploitation 
alliances tends to reinforce the tendency to explore/exploit within the function, structure and 
attribute domains, but firms tend to balance exploitation and exploration alliances within 
domains over time. Regarding the dynamics of exploitation and exploration alliances across 
domains, their findings indicated that the tendency to explore/exploit in one domain is 
compensated by the tendency to exploit/explore in other domains, and firms tend to strive for 
such a balance over time. The abovementioned studies suggest that, in addition to organizational 
features, other internal factors such as the interactive dynamism between exploitation and 
exploration could also be valuable predictors. 
 Overall, despite the lack of consistent and systematic findings in the realm of exploitation 
and exploration, current research has spawned an increasing interest in revealing what triggers 
exploitation and exploration alliance formation decisions. Given the mixed results and divergent 
prescriptions, it is worthwhile to further investigate the role of organizational antecedents in 
firms’ propensity of engaging in exploration and exploitation alliances. 
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1.2.3 Performance Implications of Exploration and Exploitation 
 Early research in strategy and organization has suggested that the exploitation-
exploration paradox demands organizations pursue one of the activities separately (Kauppila, 
2010). Ebben and Johnson (2005), for example, proposed that small firms that pursue either 
efficiency strategies or flexibility strategies outperform those that attempt to pursue both. 
Giarratana and Fosfuri (2007) also found that firms in the U.S. security software industry tend to 
be more likely to survive if they focus on either versioning strategy or portfolio broadening 
strategy, as opposed to adopting a mixed strategy. Although the efficiency versus flexibility 
strategies or versioning versus portfolio broadening strategies examined in these studies do not 
explicitly map the exploitation-exploration paradox, the notion is akin to such a framework. The 
focus view resonates with contingency theory which advocates that organizations should achieve 
a fit between their environment, structure, strategy and processes (Burns & Stalker, 1961; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). However, recent research aiming to address the trade-off between 
exploration and exploitation has suggested that focusing on one type of activities tends to result 
in overemphasis on one at the expense of the other (Fang et al., 2010). For example, 
organizations focusing on mere exploitation may enjoy immediate and certain returns from 
exploitation, but could become trapped in suboptimal solutions and poorly equipped to adapt to a 
changing environment due to lack of exploration (Denrell & March, 2011). Furthermore, a 
growing body of ambidexterity literature indicates that joint pursuit of exploitation and 
exploration can yield positive outcomes coupled with effective organizational arrangements. 
Firms are argued to perform better with an ambidexterity of exploitation and exploration (Lavie, 
Stettner, & Tushman, 2010; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).  For example, Gibson and Birkinshaw 
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(2004) were among the first to empirically support the positive influence of ambidexterity on a 
unit’s performance by leveraging innovation and flexibility as well as accumulated experience 
and efficiency simultaneously. As Levinthal and March (1993: 105) have argued, ‘the basic 
problem confronting an organization is to engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure its current 
viability and, at the same time, devote enough energy to exploration to ensure future viability.’ 
Organizational scholars have sided with this logic advocating that exploration and exploitation 
complement each other in delivering high levels of organizational performance (Boumgarden et 
al., 2012; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008). When he proposed the twin concepts, March (1991: 71) 
posited that “maintaining an appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation is a 
primary factor in system survival and prosperity”. However, he also argued that there is strategic 
contradiction between exploration and exploitation; they are self-reinforcing and tend to crowd 
each other out.  Inherent challenges arise when organizations attempt to balance exploitation and 
exploration because the two behaviors entail distinctive (even conflicting) organizational design 
elements regarding structure, incentives, and culture (Boumgarden et al., 2012). Such challenges 
could generate negative externalities and undermine organizational capacity to deliver the 
desired performance. Effectively addressing these challenges is essential to achieving high 
organizational performance. As Gupta et al. (2006: p.697) note, ‘although near consensus exists 
on the need for balance [between exploration and exploitation], there is considerably less clarity 
on how this balance can be achieved’. To address this gap, existing literature has devoted much 
attention to how organizations could stay ambidextrous, i.e., engaging in high levels of both 
exploration activity and exploitation activity. To date, multiple resolutions have been offered in 
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current literature, including structural, temporal, contextual, leadership-based, and domain-based 
approaches.   
 The structural separation approach argues for the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and 
exploitation by different organizational units in order to avoid the trade-off and conflicts between 
these two types of activities (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gupta et al., 2006). Duncan’s (1976) 
seminal work first proposed a dual-structure design for facilitating innovation in ambidextrous 
organizations. The underlying assumption is that individuals with operational responsibilities and 
bounded rationality are not capable of exploiting and exploring simultaneously. Structural 
autonomy of units allows independence of conflicting routines, structures and culture between 
the exploitation and exploration units. Recent research has shed light on the mechanism of 
organization structure as an approach to manage the balance between exploration and 
exploitation (e.g., Nickerson & Zenger, 2002; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Siggelkow & 
Levinthal, 2003). For example, O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) suggested that an “ambidextrous” 
structure with isolated divisions of the firm utilizing different routines, norms, and incentives 
would facilitate both exploration of new product lines and exploitation of existing product lines. 
Using an agent-based simulation model, Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) showed that the 
optimal organizational structure to moderate the balance of exploration and exploitation is a 
temporarily decentralized structure which starts with a decentralized structure and later 
reintegrate to a centralized one. In contrast, Jansen, Simsek and Cao (2012) examined the 
relationship between unit-level ambidexterity and performance. The authors argued that 
organizational contingencies, i.e., structural and resource attributes significantly shape this 
relationship. Based on survey data from 285 organizational units in the commercial banking 
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industry, they found that the relationship between unit ambidexterity and performance is boosted 
when the organization is decentralized, more resource munificent, or less interdependent. Fang et 
al. (2010) also argued that organizations can balance exploration and exploitation by dividing 
into semi-isolated subgroups. Based on simulation models, they found that a moderate level of 
cross-group linking leads to the highest equilibrium performance. A semi-isolated subgroup 
structure allows the diffuse of superior ideas across groups without reducing organizational 
diversity too quickly. Through an in-depth field study of a medium-sized firm, Kauppila (2010) 
investigated how the firm manages ambidexterity by employing its inter-organizational 
exploration and exploitation partnerships. He found that, on the one hand, separation between 
exploitation and exploration is needed to conduct radical exploration and exploitation, and inter-
organizational partnerships are a fitting instrument for this. On the other hand, firms need to 
balance exploitation and exploration internally. It is argued that there has been limited amount of 
large-sample archival research to provide empirical evidence for structural separation approach. 
In addition, current literature tends to demonstrate how firms can improve exploration processes 
as opposed to how firms can better manage a balance between exploitation and exploration (Fang 
et al., 2010).  
 The temporal separation approach, sometimes referred to ‘organizational vacillation’ 
(Boumgarden et al., 2012) or ‘organizational oscillation’ (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), proposes 
that organizations can achieve ambidexterity by focusing on exploration at one point of time and 
exploitation at another (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) due to bounded rationality and sequential 
attention to divergent goals (Cyert & March, 1963). This approach emphasizes a dynamic 
alternative to achieve high levels of both exploration and exploitation by temporally and 
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sequentially modulating between the two activities. By doing so, organizations may be able to 
reach higher levels of both activities than that could be achieved by an approach merely based on 
a static design choice. Scholars advocating this approach argue that in the long run, 
organizational performance is derived from the existence of high levels of exploitation and 
exploration, rather than their degree of balance or simultaneity (Boumgarden et al., 2012).  
However, empirical research in this direction is rather limited (Piao, 2010). Enlightened by the 
organizational change literature (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Gersick, 1994), a few studies 
included time dimension in examining how firms can temporally separate exploitation and 
exploration into different time horizons. Boumgarden et al. (2012) studied two approaches for 
achieving high levels of exploration and exploitation: organizational ambidexterity and 
organizational vacillation. They defined organizational ambidexterity strictly as simultaneous 
pursuit of exploitation and exploration. Based on the analysis of two canonical cases, this paper 
suggests that vacillation may offer higher long run performance than ambidexterity, while 
ambidexterity enhances performance on the margin when utilized within larger epochs of 
vacillation. Ambidexterity and vacillation are complementary with respect to performance, 
although through different mechanisms. Piao (2010) studied the temporal balance of exploration 
and exploitation. An analysis of 1980-1999 data from the hard disk drive industry suggested that 
exploitation to the exclusion of exploration generally undermines firms’ long-term viability. 
Besides, if the temporal overlap between exploitation and exploration processes is too long or 
too short, a firm tends to lose its longevity; however, if it remains at a moderate level, a firm can 
extend its longevity. The examination of temporal separation is theoretically and 
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methodologically challenging. Scholars have called for more work on the investigation of the 
longevity implication of exploitation-exploration balance in specific temporal contexts.     
 The above two approaches essentially advocate a ‘separation’ of exploitation and 
exploration, be it spatial or temporal.  In contrast, contextual ambidexterity emphasizes a 
contextual configuration of both exploitation and exploration (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; 
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Instead of focusing on the structure of the organization, Gibson 
and Birkinshaw (2004) suggested that ambidexterity should be present in the mindset of each 
individual within an organization. They assert that contextual ambidexterity is achieved ‘by 
building a set of processes or systems that enable and encourage individuals to make their own 
judgements about how to divide their time between conflicting demands for alignment and 
adaptability’ (p. 210). Given that not all organizations have the resources to support separate 
structures for exploitation and exploration, building an organizational context at the business unit 
level that allows both alignment and adaptability of knowledge could be a valuable alternative 
for organizational ambidexterity. In their study, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) collected data 
from 4,195 individuals in 41 business units and found that a context featured by a combination of 
stretch, discipline, support and trust fosters contextual ambidexterity, and in turn yield higher 
performance. Attempting to develop a comprehensive model, Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) 
studied five leading firms in the product design industry and suggested that a mindset of 
exploitation-exploration paradox should be a shared responsibility across organizational levels. 
Contextual ambidexterity emphasizes behavioral and social means of integrating exploitation and 
exploration throughout the entire organization. In contrast, the leadership-based ambidexterity 
anchors the function and leadership of the top management (Smith & Tushman, 2005). This 
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alternative puts emphasis on the ambidextrous function of top-level managers who are expected 
to balance exploration and exploitation by selectively integrating and addressing any negative 
externalities or inconsistencies in organizational design (Hambrick, 1994; Lubatkin, Simsek, 
Ling, & Veiga, 2006). Behavioral integration of top management is critical for effectively 
maintaining organizational ambidexterity. Nevertheless, existing research is mainly limited to 
conceptual, anecdotal, or single-case studies in this area, lacking holistic empirical research 
(Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). 
          Last but not least, the domain-separation approach is raised by Lavie and his colleagues 
(2011) to address the balance of exploitation and exploration in alliance formation. They argue 
that previous research on this subject has dominantly focused on exploration and exploitation 
within a single domain, e.g., engaging in innovation versus commercialization of technologies. 
Therefore the efforts of balance are bound to encounter conflicting routines and trade-offs. 
However, a balance could actually be realized across different domains, such as exploring 
through innovation and R&D alliances whereas exploiting recurrent alliance relationship with 
existing partners. This approach acknowledges that firms can engage in exploratory and 
exploitative activities in multiple domains, thus circumvent the trade-offs and conflicts. Lavie et 
al. (2011) argued that structural separation creates operational redundancy while the challenges 
of coordinating exploration and exploitation still exist. Top management team needs to make 
additional efforts to manage such challenges. In this regard, the negative externalities may 
outweigh the benefits of balance, rendering negative performance consequences. In contrast, a 
domain separation approach can relieve firms from certain inherent trade-offs and conflicts. By 
studying U.S. based firms in the software industry, Lavie et al. (2011) found that balancing 
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exploration and exploitation across domains enhanced performance. Specifically, firms that 
engage in R&D alliances while collaborating with their prior partners, or form marketing and 
production alliances with new partners gain in profits and market value. Although their study has 
thus far been the only evidence among existing empirical research adopting the domain 
separation approach, Lavie et al. (2011) offer new insights into how firms can benefit from 
balancing exploration and exploitation in alliance formation. Furthermore, the domain separation 
approach could potentially be extended to organizational ambidexterity research in general. 
Multiple domains can be investigated when studying exploitation and exploration within 
organizations.  
            In the area of exploitation and exploration alliances, current research has also examined 
other factors that could influence the performance implications of the balance. For example, 
Yamakawa et al. (2011) proposed that whether the exploration versus exploitation orientation of 
an alliance portfolio may benefit firm performance depends on how such an orientation fits the 
firm’s international organizational characteristics, strategic orientations, and the industry 
environment. Embracing the resource-based view and the relational perspective, this article 
examined the fit of three factors: firm age, strategic orientation (cost leadership or 
differentiation), and industry growth. Testing the hypotheses by using data of 95 firms from five 
industries over eight years (1988 – 1995), this article found that it is important to understand the 
relationships among firms, their alliances, the external environment, and their impacts on firm 
performance. In particular, younger firms benefit more from a higher ratio of exploitation 
alliance while older firms benefit more from a higher ratio of exploration alliances in their 
alliance portfolio. Cost leadership strategy strengthens the link between an exploitation alliance 
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orientation and firm performance. Finally, firms benefit more by forming more exploration 
alliances in a high-growth industry whereas they benefit more by forming more exploitation 
alliances in a low-growth industry.  Im and Rai (2008) investigated the impact of ambidextrous 
learning on long-term inter-organizational relationships. Based on a survey of 238 customers and 
76 vendors in the U.S. logistics industry, the authors found that both exploratory and exploitative 
knowledge sharing lead to relationship performance gains. The knowledge sharing is enabled by 
the ambidextrous management of the relationship and facilitated by ontological commitment. 
Their findings indicated that exploratory knowledge sharing and exploitative knowledge sharing 
are reinforcing and synergistic in long-term inter-organizational relationships. Rothaermel and 
Alexandre (2009) examined the organizational and technological boundaries of technology 
sourcing. The authors argued that there are two dimensions in technology sourcing: (1) whether a 
firm engages in exploration or exploitation, and (2) whether a firm sources its technology 
internally or externally. Based on a survey of 141firms in the manufacturing sector in the U.S., 
the authors found that pursing ambidexterity in technology sourcing enhances firm performance. 
Besides, higher levels of absorptive capacity allow a firm to more fully capture the benefits 
resulting from ambidexterity in technology sourcing. Since Koza and Lewin (1998) brought the 
exploitation-exploration framework into the alliance literature, there have been increasing yet not 
abundant research endeavors employing this theoretical lens. More studies are encouraged to 
uncover the mechanisms of balancing exploitation versus exploration alliances and its 
performance implications.  
 In sum, balancing exploration and exploitation is inherently challenging. Despite that 
multiple approaches have been proposed in the literature to provide guidance on how firms can 
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balance these two activities and successfully benefit from such a balance, limited empirical 
evidence has not yielded systematic or holistic prescriptions, if possible. Scholars have also 
pointed out that research attempts to synthesize multiple approaches or span multiple levels of 
organizing would help fill the void of organizational ambidexterity research (Raisch et al., 2009; 
Simsek, 2009). For instance, Cantarello et al. (2012) examined the search phase of the innovation 
process of an innovative technology-based company and argued that ambidexterity capability is 
built through a multi-level and integrated approach. The authors posited that a firm’s survival 
and growth depend greatly on its ability to balance the exploitation of existing knowledge and 
the exploration of new possibilities. They found that ambidexterity capability is the result of a 
process of three interconnected steps: a phase where managers with a double and paradoxical 
mindset recognize tensions and define the suitable practices to face these tensions, a phase where 
these practices are performed by employees, and a phase where these different pieces of 
knowledge are integrated and checked by the top management. An integration of multiple 
approaches may provide new insights into this phenomenon.  
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2. Chapter Two: The Antecedents of Exploration and Exploitation 
Alliance Formation in the U.S. Biopharmaceutical Industry 
2.1 Introduction 
 The question of what drives strategic action has occupied a central position in the 
strategic management literature (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Although multiple perspectives on 
strategic action drivers have been developed, two views have been particularly dominant: 
industry structure and organizational features. The industry structure view contends that industry 
structure and environmental conditions influence the timing and effectiveness of strategic actions 
(Bain, 1956; Caves, Fortunato, & Ghemawat, 1984; Ghemawat, 1991; Porter, 1981). In contrast, 
the perspective of organizational features posits that distinctive organizational routines and 
knowledge bases developed along unique trajectories affect an organization’s ability to process 
and analyze internal and external environments, thus determine how an organization formulates 
its strategic responses (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Wang & Li, 2008). Strategic alliance is viewed as 
a type of corporate strategic choice employed by firms in response to changes in the environment 
(Park et al., 2002). In this study, I examine exploration and exploitation alliances as two forms of 
strategic actions. March (1991) proposed two forms of organizational behavior, exploration and 
exploitation, to distinguish between two fundamentally different learning activities. Since his 
foundational work, there has been a proliferation of subsequent research in different literature 
streams employing the framework of exploitation-exploration and the scope of application has 
been greatly extended after two decades (Lavie et al., 2010; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Organizational ambidexterity has now become an emerging research paradigm in organizational 
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theory (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Simsek et al., 2009). Strategic alliances, as one of the 
contexts recently incorporating this framework, “have become a noteworthy vehicle for 
exploration and exploitation” (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006: p. 798), calling for more research 
attention (Lavie et al., 2010). 
 Scholars have argued that a firm’s formation decision of strategic alliances is embedded 
within its competitive environment and the internal resource/endowment conditions which may 
interactively affect a firm’s incentive and/or capability to establish alliances (Park et al., 2002). 
Despite the fact that the early seminal work has spawned an increasing amount of research on 
exploration and exploitation alliances, why organizations pursue exploration versus exploitation 
alliances remains unclear (Danneels & Sethi, 2011; Lavie et al., 2010). The existing exploration-
exploitation research in alliances has paid little attention to the role of environmental turbulence 
as an antecedent of alliance ambidexterity, with a few exceptions (Kim & Rhee, 2009). Those 
studies examining environmental forces have yielded results diverging from conventional 
wisdom. For example, Beckman and her colleagues (2004) suggested that market uncertainty 
would generate exploitation alliances, whereas Rowley et al. (2000) argued that uncertain 
environment requires more exploration for new innovations and alternatives. The finding that 
uncertain environment leads to exploitation alliances seems to be at odds with the traditional 
view that uncertain environment requires exploratory innovation. Meanwhile, scholars have 
pointed out that, besides industry conditions as external stimuli, internal organizational features 
which influence firms’ formation decisions of exploration and exploitation alliances should also 
be considered (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). However, research on internal drivers of 
ambidexterity in general has not reached consensus either. For instance, studies looking at 
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organizational slack have suggested that slack resources may generate either exploration (Sidhu 
et al., 2004), exploitation (Bourgeois, 1981), or curvilinear effects (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Even 
fewer studies have shed light on the organizational conditions for driving exploration and 
exploitation alliances. Given the mixed results and divergent prescriptions, the following 
research questions remain ambiguous: What are the factors affecting exploitation versus 
exploration alliance formation decisions? How do internal organizational features and 
environmental pressures influence firms’ formation of exploration and exploitation alliances?  
 The inconsistency in evidences provided by prior research on the antecedents of 
exploration and exploitation can be at least partially attributed to the differences in the 
conceptualization and contextualization of the exploration-exploitation constructs (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). The lens of exploration-exploitation has been applied to examine various 
phenomena and contexts, such as strategic alliances, product diversification, internationalization, 
and new product development, and simply generalizing the interpretations of this framework to 
different contexts may be misleading (Lavie et al., 2010). Prior research on alliance 
ambidexterity has conceptualized the twin concepts from different perspectives, including 
whether the alliances focus on upstream or downstream activities along the value chain 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), whether the alliances involve learning from new or existing 
partners (Beckman et al., 2004), or whether the alliances entail learning from partners with 
various organizational attributes (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). In this chapter of study, embracing 
organizational learning perspective and resource-based view, I investigate exploration and 
exploitation alliances in the setting of U.S. biopharmaceutical industry and build the arguments 
and analyses based on previous research in similar contexts (e.g., Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; 
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Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). I focus on the value chain function and follow prior literature 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004) by leveraging Koza and Lewin’s 
(1998) typology of alliance activity. Alliance activities that aim at exploring new competencies 
and new opportunities in the upstream of the value chain are considered as exploration alliances, 
whereas those formed to exploit existing competencies and to leverage known opportunities in 
the downstream of the value chain are referred to as exploitation alliances. The reasons for 
choosing this domain to study exploration and exploitation alliances are two folds. First, the 
value chain function in the technical context is of particular importance for firms in high-tech 
industries such as biopharmaceutical industry. Effective development and commercialization of 
new products is vital to firms’ success. Second, previous research has shed some light on the 
antecedents of exploration and exploitation alliances in the structure domain (e.g., Beckman et 
al., 2004; Li et al., 2008). It is worthwhile to direct research endeavor to other domains in an 
attempt to paint a bigger picture. To uncover the contexts that trigger exploration and 
exploitation alliances, I examine both types of antecedents by focusing on market uncertainty as 
an environmental factor, as well as organizational antecedents including innovative capacity and 
organizational slack. Given the fact that the biopharmaceutical industry is characterized of great 
uncertainty and heavy regulation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) and that product development is highly 
risky due to intensive investments in time and capital (Giovannetti & Morrison, 2000), I propose 
that firms in this industry tend to carefully craft their strategic alliances, taking both internal and 
external conditions into account. I hypothesize that both environmental uncertainty and 
organizational endowments affect the formation of exploitation and exploration alliances.  
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 I empirically test the hypotheses on a sample of 581 publicly traded biopharmaceutical 
firms that established 1,614 alliances in the 25-year period between 1985 and 2009. The 
remainder of this article is organized as follows. I first present the theoretical background for this 
research and develop the hypotheses. This is followed by a discussion of the research design and 
methods. Then I describe the analysis of the results and the findings, followed by a discussion of 
the implications.  
 
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Exploration and Exploitation in Strategic Alliances 
 The framework of exploration and exploitation proposed by March (1991) has attracted 
substantial research (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). The pursuit of new knowledge is regarded as 
exploration and the leverage of known knowledge is considered exploitation (Levinthal & 
March, 1993). This framework has been applied in the area of strategic alliances, since Koza and 
Lewin (1998) formulated the concepts of exploration and exploitation alliances. Alliance 
ambidexterity has been in the process of developing into an emerging research paradigm, yet 
without consistency. Theoretical and empirical research on the antecedents of exploration and 
exploitation alliances generates mixed findings due to the differences in conceptualization and 
contextualization (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lavie et al., 2010). Scholars have taken different 
angles (e.g., learning from activities or learning form partners) to define exploration and 
exploitation alliances, thus resulting in the divergence of findings. Therefore generalizing 
findings about the antecedents of exploration and exploitation alliances in different contexts is 
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groundless (Lavie et al., 2010). I posit that this is not a right-or-wrong world and we should not 
interpret different phenomena with the unifying lens of exploration-exploitation. 
Conceptualization of the twin constructs in strategic alliances shall be grounded in the specific 
context examined.  
 As mentioned earlier, this chapter focuses on the value chain function of exploration and 
exploitation alliances. I build the conceptualization of exploration and exploitation alliances 
following prior research on alliance ambidexterity in similar contexts (e.g., Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2010; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). March’s (1991) framework of exploration-
exploitation suggests that exploration involves experimentation and variation in new knowledge 
and opportunities whereas exploitation includes refinement and leverage of existing knowledge 
and opportunities. In their conceptual treatment, Koza and Lewin (1998) established that the type 
of alliances firms enter depends on the type of knowledge that they seek to acquire (Hess & 
Rothaermel, 2011). Consequently, firms may be motivated to enter an alliance to explore new 
knowledge and opportunities or exploit existing ones. In a similar vein, Rothaermel and Deeds 
(2004) points out that ‘precursor’ is an important source to distinguish between exploration and 
exploitation alliances: ‘The precursor to exploration is simply desire, the wish to discover 
something new. The precursor to exploitation, however, is the existence of an exploitable set of 
resources, assets, or capabilities under the control of the firm (p. 203)’.  Firms can form upstream 
alliances for the purpose of exploring for new knowledge and opportunities, while downstream 
alliances are undertaken to exploit an existing capability (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). This 
functional view emphasizes the position of an alliance along the value chain. Upstream alliances 
tend to primarily focus on generating new knowledge, while downstream alliances often focus on 
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combining and integrating existing knowledge. Firms conduct upstream research alliances to 
discover something new, allowing the partners to acquire new knowledge. In the 
biopharmaceutical industry, these types of alliances are usually undertaken with universities and 
other research institutions and technology ventures, and are often characterized by high 
uncertainty and frequent failure (Rothaermel, 2001). On the other hand, firms conduct 
downstream alliances to leverage complementary assets and to combine existing knowledge 
(Teece, 1992). Downstream alliances often join the drug development efforts of new ventures 
with larger, more well-established firms that provide manufacturing capabilities, regulatory 
know-how, and market knowledge and access (Rothaermel, 2001). Under this typology, 
exploration alliances are time consuming, require heavy commitment in resources, and the 
returns are not predictable; exploitation alliances are less risky with lower level of uncertainty 
and more predictable returns (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010).  
 Following the above argument, in the biopharmaceutical industry, exploration alliances 
focusing on basic research, drug or biomedicine discovery and development are formed to 
explore new products and opportunities; exploitation alliances that are associated with 
commercialization or downstream activities on the value chain, such as clinical trials, licensing, 
marketing and sales, are designed to leverage a firm’s existing knowledge residing in the later 
stage of the value chain. For example, a biotechnology firm Biogen formed an exploration 
alliance with University of Zurich, leading to the discovery of Intron A for the treatment of 
certain types of leukemia and hepatitis C (Rothaermal & Deeds, 2004). This exploratory 
collaboration was featured with new knowledge generation used by the partners to create novel 
molecular compound, i.e., Intron A, which was the first product of such treatments to enter 
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clinical trials. Upon the discovery of this innovative drug, Biogen engaged the pharmaceutical 
company Schering-Plough in an exploitation alliance for commercialization. The alliance 
involved exclusive licensing agreement in which Schering-Plough undertook clinical trials, 
regulatory activities, marketing, distribution, and sales. To some extent, Biogen exploited its 
existing knowledge/technology and Schering-Plough exploited its commercialization capabilities 
in the alliance which combined their complementary knowledge and capabilities. Therefore, if an 
alliance involves a new knowledge-generating agreement such as R&D or technology co-
development, it is considered an exploration alliance; if an alliance involves an agreement based 
on combining and integrating existing knowledge, such as product testing or licensing, it is 
viewed as an exploitation alliance (Ranganathan & Rosenkopf , 2014). Although it is 
acknowledged that there is likely to be new knowledge generated in exploitation alliances, the 
type and pattern of knowledge flows in exploration alliances are generally more exploratory. I 
therefore follow this approach of conceptualization which is prevalently adopted in previous 
research.  
 Another dimension of conceptualization pertains to the nature of tension between the two 
activities. When March (1991) first introduced the twin concepts of exploration and exploitation 
to the management literature, he argued that they should be viewed as two ends of a single 
continuum (Cao et al., 2009). In March’s characterization, exploration and exploitation place 
inherently conflicting resource demand and organizational demand on the firm. From this 
perspective, trade-offs between exploration and exploitation are seen as unavoidable. Other 
scholars following March’s work similarly focus on the conflicting aspects of exploratory and 
exploitative orientations, their competition for scarce resources, and the desirability of achieving 
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an optimal balance between the two (Auh & Mengue, 2005). Alternatively, another school of 
researchers have recently begun to characterize exploration and exploitation as independent 
activities that are orthogonal to each other, such that firms can manage to engage in high levels 
of both activities at the same time (Gupta et al., 2006). From this perspective, ambidexterity has 
been emphasized to pertain to the capacity of a firm to pursue high levels of exploration and 
exploitation concurrently (e.g., Cao et al., 2009) rather than managing trade-offs to find the 
optimal balance between the two. I posit that both trade-off and synergy coexist in the 
relationship between exploration and exploitation. Organizations can adopt various 
configurations to minimize the trade-off and generate synergistic effects (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004; Gupta et al., 2006). This conceptualization lays the premise of this study and will guide the 
arguments and hypotheses development in later sections.  
 
2.2.2 Innovative Capacity and Exploration versus Exploitation Alliances  
 March’s (1991) framework of exploration-exploitation builds on organizational learning 
literature. Strategic alliances are regarded as an important process for learning in which firms 
may discover new opportunities (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997). As 
an representation of an organization’s level of learning capability and absorptive capacity (Zhou 
& Wu, 2010), innovative capacity refers to a set of organizational processes and principles used 
to develop new products and explore new opportunities (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Mahmood et al., 
2011),. Construction of innovative capacity entails the accumulation of technological knowledge, 
investment in R&D activities, and new product discovery (Afuah, 2002; Zhou & Wu, 2010). As 
such, building innovative capacity over time in turn promotes organizational learning (Cohen & 
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Levinthal, 1990) and increases its level of absorptive capacity (Mahmood et al., 2011; Zhou & 
Wu, 2010). Consequently, innovative capacity plays an important role in a firm’s exploration 
activities and is worthy of research attention (Zhou & Wu, 2010).  
 Organizational learning perspective suggests that firms endowed with higher learning 
capability and absorptive capacity are more likely to engage in exploration and innovation 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Mahmood, Zhu, 
& Zajac, 2011; Zhou & Wu, 2010). Such exploration and innovation are mainly the general 
technological output, and, in many cases, developed within organizational boundaries.  The 
absorptive capacity perspective  also points out that higher innovative capacity naturally leads to 
a higher level of exploration (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). A firm, as it builds innovative 
capacity, accumulates absorptive capacity. With higher level of absorptive capacity, the firm is 
more receptive to new knowledge and information, encouraging the development of explorative 
innovation internally (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). As a firm continuously builds innovative 
capacity and develops exploration activities internally, it runs the risk of embarking on the self-
reinforcing journey in which the firm further directs its resources and routines towards 
exploration (Gilbert, 2005). Should it be true, the firm may tend to overly emphasize exploration 
at the end of the day. When a firm overemphasizes exploration to the exclusion of exploitation, it 
increases the risk of failing to appropriate returns from its costly search and experimentation 
activities (Cao et al., 2009). Teece (1986) cites company examples, such as EMI’s experience 
with the CT scanner, and contends that investment in innovation without an attendant plan to 
develop the complimentary processes to exploit the fruits of such exploration is pointless. Other 
researchers have also emphasized the need for efficient and reliable manufacturing, marketing, 
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and financial capacities for a firm to capitalize on their investments in developing new products 
and markets (Utterback, 1994).  
 Organizational learning perspective suggests that a firm with higher level of innovative 
capacity tends to emphasize internal exploration and innovation, and neglect exploitation. 
Accordingly, with respect to forming alliances as a strategic choice, seeking exploitation 
externally by forming exploitation alliances therefore serves as a good complementary measure 
to its internal focus on exploration. The resource-based view argues that firms essentially create 
alliances in order to access valuable resources that are unavailable to them and cannot be 
purchased through markets. The motive of forming alliances is value maximization through 
pooling such value-generated resources together (Das & Teng, 2000). A firm with high level of 
innovative capacity is thus more likely to look for complementary capacities from alliance 
partners. For example, Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) found that firms with strong technological 
capabilities tend to engage in more exploitation alliances, in order to gain access to 
complementary assets (e.g., manufacturing and marketing resources) to commercialize new 
products. In the biopharmaceutical industry, a technology venture with high level of innovative 
capacity is usually not strong when it comes to commercialization capabilities. It tends to seek 
exploitation alliances to facilitate product commercialization. In addition, a firm with higher 
level of innovative capacity is very likely to have more new product development projects 
waiting for commercialization and marketing. In this case, it needs to develop complementary 
measures to exploit the existing opportunities, leading to more exploitation alliances. In contrast, 
firms with higher level of innovative capacity may form exploration alliances, but will be less 
incentivized to do so. On the one hand, forming exploration alliance to co-develop new products 
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might not yield leveraging effects as exploitation alliances do and is less appealing given that 
such a firm can well develop explorative projects on its own. On the other hand, exploration 
alliances tend to involve higher level of intangible resources and tacit knowledge transfer, 
therefore are more susceptible to opportunistic behavior (Das & Teng, 2000; Tallman & 
Shenkar, 1990). As a result, a firm with high level of innovative capacity might be more willing 
to take exploration in house, to protect its tacit knowledge from potential opportunistic 
appropriation. Forming exploitation alliances is therefore a more attractive option. Consequently, 
I hypothesize that: 
H1: Firms with higher levels of innovative capacity are more likely to form exploitation 
alliances than exploration alliances. 
 
2.2.3 Organizational Slack and Exploration versus Exploitation Alliances 
 It has been demonstrated in previous research that there is an inherent trade-off between 
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991). Organizations face resource-allocation constraints 
due to the opposing nature of exploration and exploitation activities (Lavie et al., 2010). In this 
regard, organizational slack resources play an important role in the decision of exploration versus 
exploitation tendencies. Slack resources refer to “the pool of resources in an organization that is 
in excess of the minimum necessary to produce a given level of organizational output” (Nohria 
& Gulati, 1996: p. 1246).  
 Organizational slack has been studied by scholars with diverging arguments regarding its 
impact on innovation and exploration (Lavie et al., 2010). Some scholars maintain that 
organizational slack fosters exploration because it allows firms to search for and to experiment 
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with new opportunities identified, and buffers some downside risks of failure (Greve, 2007; 
Lavie et al., 2010; Levinthal & March, 1993; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Sidhu et al., 2004). In 
contrast, others challenge this point of view by arguing that organizations with slack resources 
tend to sit on their gold mines, consuming current endowments to meet performance objective as 
opposed to exploring new opportunities (Bourgeois, 1981). These organizations are less 
motivated to innovate (Lavie et al., 2010), bearing the risk of overlooking the long term 
prospects. Firms susceptible to this type of risk may enjoy short-term success from exploiting 
existing products and markets, but their success may be ephemeral—unsustainable in the face of 
significant market and technological change (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Under this 
circumstance, existing competencies can quickly become outdated and lead to powerful path 
dependencies (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000) or core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) that 
impede the firm’s learning and renewal (Cao et al., 2009).  
 These two opposing views of the impact of organizational slack depict two types of 
organizations: proactive ones and complacent ones. Lavie et al. (2010) suggest that this seeming 
contradiction can be resolved with a contingency view. One contingency is the changing 
environment. The view noting that organizations would be complacent with consuming current 
slack resources was formed in the early 80s, when business environment was relatively stable. 
However, as the environment has become much more volatile and fast changing, firms need to 
be proactive in order to survive and thrive. The characteristics of the biopharmaceutical industry 
make it a typical industry with high speed of changes and suggest a need for a proactive and 
effective way of using resources. One the one hand, R&D and innovation are costly, time 
consuming and risky, especially in the biopharmaceutical industry (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). 
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In U.S., the average R&D cost of bringing a new compound to market was estimated at $802 
million which took 8-12 years of development, and only 5 percent of the compounds under 
development would be able to make it into clinical trials (DiMasi & Hansen, 2003; Giovannetti 
& Morrison, 2000). Only firms with munificent endowments are capable of investing in 
exploration. On the other hand, biopharmaceutical firms face intense competition from generic 
manufacturers after the expiration or loss of patent protection and the U.S. patent system leaves 
firms with a limited period of protection. Thus capable firms are urged to innovate and develop 
new products in order to sustain their competitive advantage. During the enquiry interviews with 
practitioners, a manager emphasized the importance of new product development: “The patent of 
our cash cow is expiring next year. We have been pushing new drug development.” 
Consequently, biopharmaceutical firms are highly motivated to explore and innovate. The 
perspective that advocates a positive association of slack resources and exploration better 
explains how biopharmaceutical firms may be motivated. 
 In general, organization theory suggests that slack can become a resource for conflict 
solution, buffer the organization from environmental turbulence, and facilitate firms’ search and 
experiment with new strategies such as new product development (Tan & Peng, 2003). 
When there are excess resources, firms are able to allocate more resources to exploration and 
innovation, and to explore external opportunities of collaboration. With abundant resources, 
investing in exploration activities becomes plausible and more reliable because the munificence 
in resources offers strong support and helps to buffer the risks of exploration. Therefore, the 
condition that firms are capable of investing in exploration activities is met. Firms will also be 
motivated to invest in exploration alliances. Previous research has indicated that a firm’s 
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tendency to form exploration and exploitation alliances is related to its resource endowments 
(Park et al., 2002). According to the resource-based view, a primary reason for entering alliances 
is the differences in needs and resources (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996; Walker, Kogut, & 
Shan, 1997). Slack resource does not power new engines of growth as exploration and 
innovation does in the long run. In order to sustain long-term competitive advantage, firms 
would choose to devote more resources to develop complementary advantages through 
exploration alliances. In contrast, when firms have sufficient organizational slack resources such 
as financial slack, modest returns generated from exploitation alliances are less attractive, thus 
less likely to obtain organizational investment (Voss et al., 2008). In addition, a firm with slack 
resources are capable of taking exploitation in house given that it has plenty of organizational 
resources required by exploitation activities, decreasing the need for seeking external 
exploitation opportunities such as forming exploitation alliances. Therefore I suggest:  
H2: Firms with higher levels of organizational slack are more likely to form 
exploration alliances than exploitation alliances.  
 
2.2.4 Market Uncertainties and Exploration versus Exploitation Alliances 
 Although it has been widely acknowledged in the strategy and organization literature that 
external environment has critical impact on firms’ strategic decisions and subsequent 
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Soh & Roberts, 2003), the role that the environmental context 
plays in the nature of exploration versus exploitation still remains unanswered (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). Environmental conditions are argued to be 
particularly important for firms and their strategic alliances (Lin et al., 2007; Yamakawa et al., 
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2011). The fit between the environment and a firm’s choice of exploitation versus exploration 
alliances may have a significant impact on its alliance portfolio. A few studies have examined 
the roles of environmental dynamism in organizations’ tendencies to engage in exploration and 
exploitation alliances (Lavie et al., 2010). In this study, I focus on market uncertainty, i.e., the 
changes of market demand, in organizations’ industry environment. Prior research that examines 
how environmental dynamism affects exploration versus exploitation has not reached a 
consensus yet. Whereas some scholars argue that dynamic environment requires organizations to 
explore (e.g., Jansen et al., 2006; Sidhu et al., 2004), others advocate exploitation (e.g., Beckman 
et al., 2004; Kim & Rhee, 2009). There has been a general consensus reached in 
product/innovation exploration versus exploitation that turbulent and dynamic environment 
requires organizations to explore whereas stable and unfluctuating environment nurtures 
exploitation (e.g., Jansen et al., 2006; Sidhu et al., 2004). However, recent studies examining 
exploitation versus exploration alliances tend to suggest that uncertain environment results in 
more exploitation activities. For example, Beckman et al. (2004) found that the higher the level 
of market uncertainty, the more likely a firm is to reinforce its networks through establishing 
more exploitation alliances in order to manage exogenous uncertainty. Li et al. (2008) argued 
that in a turbulent technological environment, firms tend to prefer forming alliances with 
‘friends’ they trust, essentially, in order to rely on the exploitation of existing alliance 
partnerships. It is noteworthy to point out that studies reaching these two divergent conclusions 
examine exploration-exploitation with different focuses, including innovation (Jansen et al., 
2006), information acquisition (Sidhu et al., 2004), and alliance formation/partner selection 
(Beckman et al., 2004; Li et al., 2008). It is suggested that analogies can only be drawn between 
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similar phenomena (Lavie et al., 2010). This study is set in the context of strategic alliances, in 
particular, the function domain of alliances.  
 Despite the distinctive definitions and disparate phenomena investigated in prior 
research, a central premise remains the same: organizations aim at reducing uncertainty in 
dynamic environments. Market uncertainty translates into obscure and unpredictable market 
demand (Sorenson & Stuart, 2000). Under high market uncertainty, customer preferences are 
unstable and changing which is beyond the firm’s control and shared across the industry. 
Organizations tend to seek stability and trust when faced with market uncertainty (Hansen, 
1999). Firms are inclined to maintain the ‘status quo’ by continuing to do what they are doing as 
a form of threat-rigidity response (Beckman et al., 2004). However, forming alliances under 
market uncertainty involves two layers of uncertainty: the uncertainty of alliance activity and 
that of collaboration relationship. On the one hand, in the biopharmaceutical industry, 
exploration alliances involve development and discovery of new products which are associated 
with high level of risk and uncertainty. Market returns of exploration activities become even 
more unpredictable in highly uncertain markets. Organizations tend to prefer stable and 
immediate returns. On the other hand, with market uncertainty, quality assessment of potential 
partners are difficult (Podolny, 1994). Actors in the market would have difficulty determining 
the quality of a potential relationship or project. A qualified and trustworthy partner is 
particularly important for exploration initiatives because of the risk and uncertainty in 
exploratory projects per se and the potential opportunistic behavior that firms are susceptible to 
in such collaborations. Previous research has indicated that the challenge of negotiating and 
structuring contracts in the face of uncertainty often causes frictions between partners 
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(Rothaermal & Deeds, 2004). It will be more challenging to handle another layer of uncertainty 
regarding collaboration on exploratory projects. Therefore, when the potential benefits of 
alliances may be offset by the high costs and risks under high level of market uncertainty, firms 
will tend to refrain from the formation of exploration alliances. Although compared to 
exploration alliances, exploitation alliances may be able to generate more reasonable and 
predictable returns; I argue that firms will tend to rely on themselves or existing relationships for 
exploitation as opposed to forming more exploitation alliances. To mitigate the market threats of 
unpredictable demand, firms may want to leverage exploitation of existing products. However, 
as the difficulty of assessing the potential partners’ quality increases in highly uncertain markets, 
firms may turn to internal sources for commercialization or marketing or simply depend on 
existing partnerships due to reinforced stability and trust. Exploitation alliances are also argued 
to be exposed to substantial hazards stemming from disputes and from investments in specialized 
assets in biopharmaceutical industry (Rothaermal & Deeds, 2004). Forming exploitation 
alliances would be discouraged by the uncertain future of the partnership and the market (Park et 
al., 2002). Thus firms are less likely to engage in new exploitation alliances for the benefits of 
exploitation under market uncertainty. As a result, I hypothesize that: 
H3: At higher levels of market uncertainty, firms are less likely to form either 
exploration or exploitation alliances.  
 
2.2.5 Interaction Effect between Innovative Capacity and Market Uncertainty 
 As argued in the previous section, in uncertain markets, firms might be reluctant to 
establish external collaborations (either exploitation alliances or exploration alliances) due to 
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additional uncertainty these collaborations may entail. On another note, previous research has 
acknowledged the benefits of exploration in dynamic environment (e.g., Jansen et al., 2006; 
Sidhu et al., 2004). Branching into a new to the firm technology domain increases the stock of 
opportunities to which the firm has access (Fleming, 2001). The knowledge components that the 
firm acquires in the new domain can then be recombined with its existing knowledge to 
introduce heterogeneity that facilitates problem solving (Kotha, Zheng, & George, 2011). The 
variety in problem-solving approaches increases the likelihood that solutions can be found for 
technological and market bottlenecks (Kotha et al., 2011), enabling firms to better address 
market uncertainty. As such, searching through exploration may have positive implications in 
uncertain markets in this regard. Although exploration and innovation are desired in uncertain 
markets, whether a firm is able to achieve it tends to depend on its endowments and capabilities. 
I argue that from the perspective of organizational learning, a firm with higher level of 
innovative capacity will be more capable of engaging in external collaborations for exploration, 
compared to a firm with lower level of innovative capacity. First, a firm with higher level of 
innovative capacity will be endowed with the capability of leveraging the benefits of exploration, 
even in uncertain environment. A firm’s capacity to learn and assimilate knowledge from 
partners determines the benefits it can receive from exploration alliances. The presence of an 
infrastructure to innovate, such as research laboratories and scientific human capital, increase the 
potential for a firm to absorb and assimilate information, sailing through uncertainty (Zucker, 
Darby, & Brewer, 1998). Second, a firm with higher level of innovative capacity generally 
possess and information advantage and is likely to be more capable of assessing the partners’ 
quality under market uncertainty (Lerner, Shane, & Tsai, 2003). It will be easier for them to find 
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the qualified ones to collaborate on explorative projects. Third, high innovative capacity signals 
high quality, making the firm an attractive candidate for other firms that seek partnerships. 
Therefore, firms with higher level of innovative capacity are more likely to overcome the 
impediments of forming exploration alliances in uncertain markets. The likelihood is also higher 
with respect to forming exploitation alliances. A firm with higher level of innovative capacity is 
likely to possess more promising product development in the pipeline. In uncertain markets, it 
needs and tends to be more proactive to ‘reap the corn’ before it is outdated by uncertain 
markets. With a relative strength in developing innovative projects, a firm tends to develop the 
complimentary processes through exploitation alliances. Commercialization, manufacturing, or 
marketing resources provided by alliance partners could well complement its capability to 
exploit the explored product development. In a similar vein, other researchers have stressed the 
need for efficient and reliable manufacturing, marketing, and financial capacities for a firm to 
capitalize on their investments in developing new products and markets in uncertain 
environments (Utterback, 1994). Consequently, I hypothesize that:  
H4: Firms with higher innovative capacity tend to be more willing to form 
exploration and exploitation alliances in uncertain markets. 
 
2.2.6 Interaction Effect between Organizational Slack and Market Uncertainty 
 It has been established in previous literature that a firm’s stock of slack resources, such as 
financial capital, functions as a buffer that mitigates the effects of exogenous risks and shocks in 
turbulent environment (Bourgeois, 1981; Thompson, 1967). Slack resources such as 
uncommitted financial resources are highly flexible. Organizations are able to redeploy and 
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reallocate them whenever needed (Voss et al., 2008). They can thus be easily dedicated to some 
specialized departments and functions in order to effectively respond to potentially damaging 
risks in highly uncertain environment (Thompson, 1967). Therefore, it is argued that with higher 
level of organizational slack as a better buffer, the risks of engaging in exploitation or 
exploration alliances in uncertain markets will be less threatening (Cao et al., 2009). A ‘deeper 
pocket’ cushions the potential adverse effects on performance in this respect. Firms with larger 
resource bases will tend to perceive fewer threats and be more able to cope with threats in 
uncertain environment. Firms with slack resources thus have higher capability and opportunity to 
use exploration and exploitation alliances to overcome market uncertainty or threats (Park et al., 
2002). They will be more encouraged to engage in strategic alliances under this circumstance.  
 Furthermore, resources play an important role in providing effective support to fuel a 
firm’s activities, and I reason that, where possible, the enhancement of exploration and 
exploitation through alliances will be enormously taxing on available resources. Because 
exploration and exploitation represent very different organizational processes, they may each 
require different sets of supporting resources (March 1991). For instance, because of the need for 
different processes, values, and culture, a firm may have to create and deploy alliances that are 
devoted to searching for new products and separate them from those dedicated to appropriating 
returns from existing products and markets (Christensen, 1997; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). The 
exploitative alliance activities need to mobilize information and knowledge within the firm to 
improve the efficiency of existing organizational routines (Benner & Tushman, 2003; March, 
1991), whereas the exploratory alliance activities need to get detached from the existing routines 
with more scanning of information and knowledge external to the firm (McGrath, 2001). With 
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munificent slack resource, firms will be able to support both kinds of activities, especially in 
uncertain markets. In fact, higher level of organizational slack means that additional resources 
can be allocated timely to more effectively leverage exploration and exploitation alliances in 
response to the dynamic markets (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). The proactive management of 
slack resources through forming exploration and exploitation alliances is likely to help firms 
handle the risks and uncertainty (Dickson & Weaver, 1997). Therefore I suggest, 
H5: Firms with more slack resources tend to be more willing to form exploration 
and exploitation alliances in uncertain markets.  
 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Research Setting and Sample 
 This study is designed as a pooled time series analysis of alliances formed by U.S. 
biotechnology firms (SIC codes 2833-2836). The pharmaceutical industry offers an appropriate 
setting because the high level of innovative activities and the commercialization of technology 
are characterized by intensive alliance relations (Rothaermeli & Boeker, 2008). The intensity of 
alliance in pharmaceutical industry accounts for a high proportion of the observed strategic 
alliances in high-technology industries (Hagedoorn, 1993). Besides, firms in this industry 
develop in an environment of great uncertainty as well as heavy regulations from multiple 
departments (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), which greatly influences organizations’ strategic actions.  
 This study’s time frame spanned the years 1985 to 2009. Prior work employing the same 
time frame suggests that a 25-year period serves well in capturing the upturns and downturns in 
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the growth of the industry (e.g., Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). In addition, previous research studying 
alliances also sets 1985 as a base year or the starting year (e.g., Beckman et al., 2004; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006) and there were much fewer alliances formed in this industry before 1985. The 
sample included 581 publicly traded United States-based pharmaceutical firms that had records 
in both Securities Data Corporation (SDC) and COMPUSTAT datasets. 1,614 alliances were 
identified between 1985 and 2009, and the number of alliances formed by a focal firm ranged 
between 1 alliance to 11 alliances in a given year.  
2.3.2 Data Collection 
 The bulk of the data on alliances was retrieved from the SDC database. The SDC 
database is one of the most commonly used and comprehensive alliance databases (Schilling, 
2009). The alliance data was verified and corrected using the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filings, the Bloomberg database, and corporate websites. The validity of the 
alliance data was therefore enhanced by relying on multiple sources. Overall, I identified 1,995 
alliances formed by 812 focal firms with the SIC codes of 2833-2836. Firm-specific data, such as 
total assets, R&D expenses, net income, and retained earnings, were extracted from 
COMPUSTAT database.  
 To match the data from the SDC database and the COMPUSTAT database, I took several 
steps. First, I compared and matched the CUSIP codes in both databases. CUSIP code in SDC is 
recorded in 6 digits whereas that in COMPUSTAT is in 9 digits. I extracted all 9-digit CUSIP 
codes of firms with the SIC codes of 2833-2836 from COMPUSTAT then identified those firms 
whose first 6 digits of COMPUSAT CUSIP codes were the same as SDC CUSIP codes. The first 
round of matching yielded 372 focal firms. Second, due to changes in company names, CUSIP 
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codes, and the differences of recording systems, the discrepancy between SDC and 
COMPUSTAT could result in substantial loss of data. I tracked the name of each company in the 
Company Code database of COMPUSTAT as well as the SEC filings, resulting in 209 more 
focal firms identified. Overall, I identified 1,614 alliances involving 581 publicly traded focal 
firms in the sample, accounting for 80.9 percent of the alliances and 71.6 percent of the firms. 
High percentage of the public firms therefore limited the potential biases that may come from the 
lack of financial information for private partners (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006).  
 The unit of analysis is firm-year; therefore I transformed the data to firm-year 
observations by pooling the data across all alliances formed by each focal firm in a given year. 
For each focal firm, between the year when it formed its first alliance and the year when it 
established the last one recorded in the database, I assigned a value of zero to alliance formed in 
a given year when it did not have alliance records. A value of zero was also assigned to the year 
before its first alliance and to the year after its last alliance. The final data included 4,202 firm-
year observations.  
 
2.3.3 Measures 
 Exploration and exploitation alliances. The dependent variables, exploration and 
exploitation alliances, were constructed by counting the number of exploration or exploitation 
alliances for each sampled firm in a given year. Following previous research (e.g., Koza & 
Lewin, 1998; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), I coded exploration and exploitation alliances by 
considering the nature of the alliance activity. Those focusing on basic research, drug or 
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biomedicine discovery and development were coded as exploration alliances. The following is an 
example of an alliance announcement I coded as exploration: 
August 30, 1988 - Calgene and Campbell Soup Co. signed an agreement to jointly 
develop a genetically-engineered gene for fresh tomatoes. The two companies 
developed an antisense polygalacturonase gene, which suppressed the levels of 
polygalacturonase in tomatoes, thereby reducing pectin degradation and fruit 
softening. This "Flavr Savr" gene prolonged shelf life, enhanced resistance to post-
harvest disease, and also allowed the tomatoes to better survive handling during 
shipments. 
 Alliances that were associated with commercialization or downstream activities on the 
value chain, such as clinical trials, licensing, marketing and sales, were classified as exploitation 
alliances. An example of exploitation alliance is as following: 
December 31, 1989-Cambridge Biotech Corp and Diagnostics Pasteur signed a cross 
licensing agreement which granted each other access to each participant's AIDS and 
HTLV-1 antibody diagnostics. 
 Market uncertainty. The independent variable, market uncertainty, captures the industry 
level of environmental uncertainty. I used objective measures based on the original work of Tosi, 
Aldag, and Storey (1973), which has been applied frequently in previous studies (e.g., 
Bourgeois, 1985; Folta, 1998; Gohosh & Olsen, 2009; Sasson, 2008). This variable is measured 
by computing the coefficient of variation in the industry. I calculated the volatility of sales over 
five years in several steps, using the following formula:  
               Coefficient of Variation = = √∑
(    ̅)
 
 
 
      ̅⁄            (1) 
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Where  
Yi = average sales in year i in this industry; 
 ̅  = average sales over the five year period in this industry. 
 The coefficient of variation of a focal year was calculated based on the five-year period 
prior to this year. First, the industry averages of sales per year were computed. Then I calculated 
the sum of the one-fifth of the squared term of the average sales for each year minus the average 
sales over the five-year period. And the square root of the sum was divided by the average sales 
over the five-year period.  
 Organizational slack. Previous studies have measured organizational slack in multiple 
ways, including accounting-based financial and non-financial measures (Bradley, Shepherd, & 
Wiklund, 2011; Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner, 2004; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Reliance 
on standard financial data to measure organizational slack can be traced back to the early work of 
Bourgeois (1981) and has been applied frequently in subsequent slack research (e.g., Bradley et 
al., 2011; Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Zajac, Golden, & Shortell, 
1991). Organizational financial slack allows firms to allocate the spare resources for various uses 
(Bradley et al., 2011). Along this line of research, I measured organizational slack using the 
following three items: 1) retained earnings, 2) working capital as a percent of sales, and 3) debt 
as a percent of equity.  
 Innovative capacity. Scholars have used both subjective and objective measurements to 
capture firms’ innovative capacity (e.g., Coad & Rao, 2008; Song, Droge, Hanvanich, & 
Calantone, 2005; Zhou & Wu, 2010). In this study, I employed the objective measurement using 
the R&D intensity as an indicator for innovative capacity (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). It was 
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operationalized as the ratio of a firm’s annual R&D expenses over its assets. Prior research 
indicates that R&D spending is a good indicator of the firm’s technological position (Hall, 2004). 
A firm’s R&D intensity represents their innovative and technological capacity inside the firm, 
which may affect their external exploration activities (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). 
 Control variables. I controlled for firm-specific factors that might influence their 
inclination to engage in exploration and exploitation alliances. Firm size has been examined in 
previous studies with mixed findings regarding its impact on the tendency to explore versus 
exploit (Beckman et al., 2004; Lavie et al., 2010; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). I controlled for 
this confounding factor measured by the logged value of a firm’s assets in a focal year. Firm 
performance measured as the ratio of net income to total assets (ROA) was included to account 
for the possibility that financial performance might drive exploration or exploitation (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Levinthal & March, 1993). ROA is commonly used in current literature as an 
objective measure of organizational profitability or economic performance (Bae & Gargiulo, 
2004; Lin, Yang, & Arya, 2009). Further, I controlled for prior exploration and exploitation 
alliance experience. A firm’s past experience in exploration and exploitation alliances are highly 
likely to affect its tendencies to engage in exploration or exploitation alliances in the future 
(Ahuja, 2000; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Tsai, 2001). Therefore, following previous research 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006), I operationalized past exploration and 
exploitation alliance experience as a count of all prior exploration and exploitation alliances 
formed by a focal firm between 1985 and the preceding year. Finally, I included the number of 
exploitation alliances in a given year as a control variable in the regression analysis of 
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exploration alliances, and the number of exploration alliances in exploitation alliances 
regression.  
 
2.3.4 Analysis 
 I used Bayesian multilevel models to test the influence of organizational and 
environmental factors on firms’ alliance activities. Suggested by strategy scholars in recent years 
(Hahn & Doh, 2006; Hansen, Perry, & Reese, 2004), Bayesian methods are especially useful in 
detailed examinations of strategy problems in complex business environments which are 
increasingly characterized by change and uncertainty. The Bayesian approach is superior to 
traditional methodological approaches in potentially accounting for variables and relationships 
that may go unobserved (Hahn & Doh, 2006). As the two dependent measures were count 
variables, I used the Poisson models and log link to test the hypotheses. To incorporate 
unobserved firm heterogeneity, I introduced a firm-specific intercept term in the multilevel 
Poisson models by including firm as a random effect, as follows: 
log (Exploration alliances (f t) ) = βR X(f t) + K R f  + e R (f t)             (2) 
log (Exploitation alliances (f t) ) = βI X(f t) + K I f  + e R (f t) 
where f subscripts the firms and t subscripts time; βR  and βI  are the parameter estimates for the 
effect of the various explanatory variables at the Exploration alliances and Exploitation alliances 
respectively; K R f  and K I f  represent the firm-specific term for incorporating unobserved 
heterogeneity; and e R (f t) stands for the error term. Due to the prevalence of zero outcomes in the 
dependent variables, I fit a zero-inflated multilevel Poisson (ZIP) model (Gelman & Hill, 2007).  
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 I estimated the ZIP model specified in equation (2) using Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods (Gilks, Richardson, & Spiegelhalter, 1998). MCMC estimation methods allow 
full distributions of the parameters through simulation (Hahn & Doh, 2006). An inverse Wishart 
prior distribution was used for the firm and residual variance components, and a multivariate 
normal distribution was used for other fixed effects. I allowed 20,000 iterations to elapse to give 
the simulation to reach its final steady state. The mode and the 95% credible interval (CI) of the 
simulated posterior distribution were used to estimate fixed and random effects, as is standard in 
Bayesian models. For model comparison purposes, I estimated five models for both dependent 
variables respectively: (1) a model with only the control variables as explanatory variables, (2) a 
model with both control variables and firm-specific factors, and (3) a model with all the firm-
specific, environmental, and control variables. The deviance information criterion (DIC) was 
used to compare the models, where smaller values indicate better fit (Hadfield, 2010). All 
models were fit using the MCMCglmm R package (Version 2.13.1; Hadfield, 2010).  
 
2.4 Results 
 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of variables. I did not observe 
high correlations among independent variables, and I also checked whether multicollinearity 
might be a threat. I examined the variance inflation factor value for each variable, all of which 
were is far below the recommended limit of ten (Chatterjee & Price, 1991), suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a threat to the validity of the findings.  
 Modeling results are provided in Table 3. I included the control variables and explanatory 
variables to test the different hypotheses in multiple models step by step. When necessary, the 
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variables were mean-centered to generate their interaction terms. Models M1to M5 are 
regressions on exploration alliances and Models M6 to M10 use exploitation alliances as 
dependent variable. M1 and M6 include only control variables. Then I added firm-specific 
factors in Models M2 and Model M7. Models M3 and Model M8 represent models with all 
predicting variables. Models M4 and M9 included the interaction of innovative capacity and 
market uncertainty, and finally M5 and M10 included the interaction of organizational slack and 
market uncertainty. Based on DIC values, the model fit generally improves when I included 
more variables into the regression of two dependent variables respectively.  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
                                   
a 
N = 4,202; 
b 
N = 2,520; 
c 
N = 2,515; 
d 
N = 2,469; 
e 
N = 2,369;  * p < .05   ** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.   No. of exploitation alliances a .12 .36         
2.   No. of exploration alliances a .36 .69 .04
**
        
3.   Firm size b   2.15 1.14 .11
**
 .23
**
       
4.   Firm performance c   -.49 3.69 .03 .02 .23
**
      
5.   Past exploitation experience a .61 1.50 .10
**
 .24
**
 .52
**
 .06
**
     
6.   Past exploration experience a 1.62 3.87 .05
**
 .30
**
 .51
**
 .05
**
 .71
**
    
7.   Innovative capacity d .32 .51 .05
**
 -.04
*
 -.40
**
 -.20
**
 -.14
**
 -.12
**
   
8.   Organizational slack e  .01 .57 .03
*
 .15
**
 .26
**
 .03 .27
**
 .34
**
 -.09
**
  
9.  Market uncertainty a .07 .04 -.05
**
 -.02 .17
**
 -.01 .05
**
 .10
**
 .02 .05
*
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Table 3 Zero-inflated Poisson Models of Control and Independent Variables against Exploration and Exploitation Alliance Founding a 
a. Coefficients are the mode of the posterior distribution; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
b. Dependent variables                 c.  95% CI 
 
Predictor Variables 
                                 Exploration alliances 
b
                                    Exploitation alliances
 b
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
Firm size 
.327*** 
[.25, .37] 
c
 
.272*** 
[.16, .41] 
.133*** 
[.03, .23] 
.203*** 
[.08, .34] 
.261*** 
[.17, .36] 
.319*** 
[.06, .50] 
.378*** 
[.22, .53] 
.094** 
[.03, .15] 
.360*** 
[.23, .47] 
.028 
[-.05, .10] 
Firm performance 
-.078*** 
[-.09, -.06] 
-.080*** 
[-.12, -.04] 
-.044*** 
[-.05, -.04] 
-.043 
[-.09, .00] 
-.071*** 
[-.11, -.03] 
-.120*** 
[-.18, -.04] 
.116*** 
[.04, .16] 
.042*** 
[.01, .07] 
-.206*** 
[-.23, -.15] 
-.061*** 
[-.09, -.05] 
Past exploration experience 
-.013* 
[-.03, -.00] 
-.011 
[-.03, .01] 
.024*** 
[.01, .04] 
.020* 
[.00, .04] 
.010 
[-.01, .03] 
.040** 
[.01, .06] 
.038 
[-.01, .10] 
.020 
[-.02, .04] 
.008 
[-.02, .04] 
.028** 
[.01, .04] 
Past exploitation experience 
.111*** 
[.07, .15] 
.078*** 
[.03, .13] 
.019 
[-.00, .04] 
.026 
[-.03, .08] 
.013 
[-.04, .08] 
-.147* 
[-.23, -.01] 
-.005 
[-.12, .11] 
-.049 
[-.11, .02] 
.013 
[-.14, .12] 
-.007 
[-.08, .06] 
Current exploitation/ 
exploration experience 
.032 
[-.14, .10] 
.106 
[-.03, .25] 
.170*** 
[.09, .27] 
.123 
[-.04, .30] 
-.006 
[-.15, .11] 
.116*** 
[.04, .24] 
.032 
[-.07, .12] 
.066 
[-.02, .17] 
.020 
[-.13, .25] 
.183*** 
[.14, .23] 
Innovative capacity (IC)  
-.040 
[-.24, .16] 
-.239*** 
[-.38, -.11] 
-.270 
[-.61, .06] 
.067 
[-.12, .24] 
 
.576*** 
[.12, .87] 
.246* 
[.07, .40] 
-1.171*** 
[-2.28, -.45] 
-.466 
[-.77, .13] 
Organizational slack  
.132* 
[.02, .26] 
.171*** 
[.10, .27] 
.010 
[-.04, .23] 
.548** 
[.23, .89] 
 
-.892*** 
[-1.29, -.36] 
-.293*** 
[-.51, -.08] 
-.626** 
[-.88, -.11] 
-.798*** 
[-1.03, -.52] 
Market uncertainty (MKT)   
-2.700*** 
[-4.30, -.96] 
-3.614*** 
[-5.57, -1.89] 
-2.707* 
[-4.55, -.65] 
  
-2.683*** 
[-4.18, -1.34] 
.690 
[-2.31, 4.27] 
-2.159 
[-4.15, .79] 
MKT x IC    
2.551* 
[.15, 5.30] 
    
8.237*** 
[4.65, 13.09] 
 
MKT x Slack     
-1.766** 
[-3.17, -.48] 
    
2.458*** 
[.99, 3.32] 
DIC 3800.27 3795.25 3731.05 3791.85 3789.64 1886.65 1782.99 1817.142 1787.80 1852.64 
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 In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that a firm with higher level of innovative capacity will be 
more likely to form exploitation alliances than exploration ones. Model 2 and Model 5 in Table 2 
shows that an increase in the rate of the focal firm’s innovative capacity serves as a significant 
predictor of its number of exploitation alliances formed (b = .576, p < .001), and innovative 
capacity is negatively associated with and has non-significant effect  on the number of 
exploration alliances. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported, indicating that firms with higher level of 
innovative capacity are more likely to form exploitation alliances than exploration alliances. 
Hypothesis 2 postulated that a firm with higher level of organizational slack will be inclined to 
form more exploration alliances than exploitation ones. As shown in Model 2 and Model 5, 
organizational slack was significantly and positively associated with the number of exploration 
alliances (b = .132, p < .05) as well as significantly and negatively related to the number of 
exploitation alliances (b = -0.892, p < .001), supporting Hypothesis 2. As expected, the results 
confirm that capable firms with abundant slack resources tend to explore new opportunities 
through alliances. I next turn to environmental factors in the industry. I predicted in Hypotheses 
3 that market uncertainty will diminish the number of both exploitation alliances and exploration 
alliances. For Hypothesis 3, the results in Model 3 show that market uncertainty is negatively 
associated with the number of exploration alliances (b = -2.700, p < .001) and results in Model 8 
show that it is negatively and significantly predicting the number of exploitation alliances (b = -
2.683, p < .001), supporting Hypothesis 3. Although the focal firms may be motivated to exploit 
or explore in order to mitigate market uncertainty, it is difficult to evaluate the potential of 
uncertain markets. Unpredictable returns discourage the willingness of potential partners, 
decreasing the realization of both exploration and exploitation collaborations. Regardless, the 
69 
 
findings support the position that firms tend to respond to environmental turbulence by 
constructing its alliance portfolio. The ‘industry’ affects the configuration of exploitation and 
exploration alliances in a firm’s portfolio. Hypothesis 4 posits that innovative capacity moderates 
the relationship between market uncertainty and exploitation/exploration alliance formation, such 
that firms with higher level of innovative capacity tend to be more willing to form such alliances 
in uncertain markets. Model 4 and Model 9 together test this hypothesis. The coefficient of the 
interaction term (Market uncertainty X Innovative capacity) in both models are positive and 
significant (b = 2.551, p < .05 in Model 4; b = 8.237, p < .001 in Model 9), indicting a positive 
moderating effect. Theoretically, it shows that higher level of innovative capacity will enhance 
the likelihood or mitigate the unwillingness to form exploitation versus exploration alliances in 
uncertain markets. Figure 2 visualizes the moderating effect of innovative capacity. It shows that 
with respect to exploitation alliances, firms with high level of innovative capacity tend to form 
more exploitation alliances as market uncertainty increases; in contrast, firms with low level of 
innovative capacity tend to form less exploitation alliances as market uncertainty increases. 
Regarding exploration alliances, Figure 2 shows that firms with high level of innovative capacity 
tend to be less unwilling to engage in exploration alliances as market uncertainty increases, 
compared to firms with low level of innovative capacity. Therefore Hypothesis 4 is generally 
supported. Finally, Hypothesis 5 looks at the moderating effect of organizational slack. I posit a 
positive moderating effect of organizational slack, similar to innovative capacity. Model 5 and 
Model 10 together test this hypothesis. The coefficient of the interaction term in Model 10 is 
positive and significant (b = 2.458, p < .001), whereas that in Model 5 it is negative and 
significant (b = -1.766, p < .01). The results indicate that the hypothesized moderating effect is 
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supported with respect to exploitation alliance formation, but the reverse effect is found with 
respect to exploration alliance formation. As can been seen from Figure 2, firms with high level 
of organizational slack tend to establish more exploitation alliances as market uncertainty 
increases. However, such firms tend to form less exploration alliances in highly uncertain 
markets. Hypothesis 5 is therefore partially supported. This finding somehow affirms the risk 
adverse side and the complacency nature of firms when faced with uncertainty. In uncertain 
environment, firms may tend to avoid such risk-taking activities as exploration alliances; when 
they are blessed with high organizational slack, firms may be inclined to be complacent and 
further decline risk taking.  
 To summarize, I find support for the expected effects for the main effects of firm-specific 
factors and environmental factor. A firm’s level of innovative capacity and that of slack 
resources have diverging effects on the formation of exploitation and exploration alliances. I also 
find that environmental conditions such as market uncertainty relate to exploitation versus 
exploration alliance decisions. Market uncertainty reduces the formation of both exploration and 
exploitation alliances. Both organizational and industrial conditions shape organizational 
strategic choices. In addition, organizational conditions influence the industry’s impact on firms’ 
strategic actions.  
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Figure 2 Interaction effects of organizational factors and market uncertainty 
Interaction Effect between Innovative Capacity and Market Uncertainty 
 
 
Interaction Effect between Organizational Slack and Market Uncertainty 
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2.5 Discussion 
This paper examines the antecedents of exploration and exploitation alliances formed by 
firms in the U.S. biopharmaceutical industry. The findings generate insights for existing research 
on exploration-exploitation in strategic alliances which falls short of understanding that why 
organizations pursue exploration or exploitation alliances (Lavie et al., 2010).  
 The results showed that firms with high innovative capacity tend to seek more external 
exploitative collaborations as opposed to explorative collaborations. It is at first sight countering 
the conventional wisdom in organizational learning literature that firms with higher level of 
innovative capacity are able to identify and absorb external knowledge and learning 
opportunities through exploration activities (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). However, a deeper 
examination could reveal that the focus of exploitation-exploration varies. Organizational 
learning suggests that higher level of innovative capacity tends to lead to more exploration 
activities, mainly pertaining to internal product/innovation exploration, whereas this study 
focuses on exploration alliance as a form of external collaboration. Firms with high innovative 
capacity could emphasize internal exploration more than external exploration collaborations, and 
leverage exploitation alliances. My finding is in consistency with the work of Wang and Li 
(2008) that suggests firms with higher technological capability make less effort in explorative 
search beyond the firm. This finding expands March’s exploration-exploitation learning 
framework, which traditionally provides insights to internal activities to the context of strategic 
alliances. The results also tap on the tension view of exploration and exploitation activities. 
When firms are endowed with more slack resources, they tend to invest more on exploration 
alliances as opposed to exploitation alliances. It indicates that exploration and exploitation do 
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compete for organizational resources, as firms make resource allocation decisions (March, 1991; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2000). This finding also shows that firms build their strategic choices 
according to their organizational features. It is consistent with prior literature that advocates the 
positive role of slack resources in promoting exploration activities and its function as buffering 
the possible downside risks (Greve, 2007; Sidhu et al., 2004). The impact of organizational 
factors on a firm’s alliance formation decision suggests that internal features help shape a firm’s 
strategic choices. 
 The results also shed light on the role of environmental dynamism in exploration and 
exploitation alliances. Prior research has been debating that whether firms should explore or 
exploit in dynamic environments (Beckman et al., 2004; Jansen et al., 2006; Kim & Rhee, 2009; 
Sidhu et al., 2004); the findings provide two folds of implications. First, it is important to define 
the boundary and context of exploration-exploitation. Although Beckman et al. (2004) suggested 
that market uncertainty leads to more exploitation alliances, they considered forming alliances 
with prior partners as a form of exploitation. In essence, it is acknowledged that ‘reinforcement’ 
and ‘stability’ is critical in uncertain environment. This study, in contrast, focuses on the 
‘function’ domain of exploitation versus exploration alliances. I found that uncertain market 
depresses the formation of both exploitation and exploration alliances.  In such a context, both 
exploration and exploitation alliances are characterized of high degree of uncertainty due to the 
uncertainty of alliances activities per se as well as the uncertainty of collaboration in turbulent 
market. As such, environmental dynamism will lead to less exploitation alliances and exploration 
alliances because firms long for uncertainty reduction through strategic actions. Second, I 
examined the interactions between environmental uncertainty and organizational features. The 
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results show that organizational specific factors influence its response to external environment. 
When firms have high level of innovative capacity and organizational slack, they tend to be more 
courageous in forming alliances in uncertain markets. To some extent, with higher capability and 
better endowments, organizations tend to be more proactive as opposed to passively respond to 
the changes in the external environment.  
 Some of the secondary findings from control variables are also worth highlighting. I find 
that increase in organizational size tends to increase the number of exploitation alliances as well 
as exploration alliances formed by firms. Although current literature generates conflicting 
findings regarding the impact of organizational size on firms’ tendency to explore versus exploit 
(Lavie et al., 2010), my finding tend to support both sides of the story. The organizational inertia 
perspective argues that larger firms are more inclined to engage in exploitation alliances due to 
increasing inertia. The result is in consistence with the findings of prior research in similar 
context supporting this line of logic (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). The resource-based 
perspective asserts that larger organizations can support exploration in their alliances because 
they have better access to resources. My finding resonates with that of Beckman et al. (2004), 
whose findings show that large firms respond to external stimuli by forming more exploration 
and exploitation alliances. To some extent, these findings supports the conclusion made by 
Gupta et al. (2006) that organization context matters: as firm size increases, exploitation and 
exploration may tend to be orthogonal rather than competing ends of a continuum since firms are 
more capable of supporting both activities. In addition, the results indicate that a firm’s past 
exploitation (exploration) experience tends to facilitate its formation of exploration (exploitation) 
alliances whereas reduces the formation of additional exploitation (exploration) alliances. These 
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results, in a sense, indicate the propensity that organizations may balance their exploration and 
exploitation activities over time and exploitation may reinforce exploration activities, as argued 
by other scholars in previous studies (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006).  
 On the aggregate, I find that a firm’s strategic choice between exploration alliance versus 
exploitation alliance is a reflection of both organizational intention as well as an adaption to 
environmental turbulence. This finding is in line with the literature of organizational adaption 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Organizations are able to respond to 
environmental change, while those with capabilities are likely to craft its strategic choice 
configurations based upon its own characteristics, suggesting the possibility of organizational 
balance between continuity and change.  This study is, of course, not free of limitations. Some of 
the limitations of this study could be addressed by future research efforts. First, although I 
simultaneously examined both organizational and environmental antecedents of exploration and 
exploitation alliances, I included only a limited number of factors. Future research can examine a 
variety of organizational and environmental factors and untangle more confounding interactions 
between organizational and industry conditions. For example, more environmental triggers could 
be investigated to answer to the claim that the multidimensionality of environment dynamism 
should be taken into account when scholars study its implications for organizations (McCarthy, 
Lawrence, Wixted, & Gordon, 2010). Besides, the combinations of more organizational 
conditions and environmental forces may provide richer understanding of organizations’ 
exploration and exploitation choices (Lavie et al., 2010).   
 Second, I treated organizations’ exploration and exploitation alliances as separate 
dimensions and controlled for firms’ past experience in exploration-exploitation, thus leaving out 
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the issue of balancing exploration and exploitation. The secondary findings indicate that firms 
may balance between exploration and exploitation tendencies. Organizational and environmental 
pressures may result in conflicting demands for short-term efficiency and long-term 
effectiveness (Lavie et al., 2010; Smith & Tushman, 2005). Future research is encouraged to 
investigate the organizational factors and environmental contingencies to uncover whether and 
how firms balance between exploration and exploitation alliances. In this regard, a time 
dimension could be further introduced to longitudinally assess under what conditions firms will 
temporally adjust exploration and exploitation alliances.  
 Third, I focus on the antecedents of exploration-exploitation framework in the context of 
strategic alliances, which tells the first half of the story. Future research could examine the other 
half of the story, the consequences of exploration and exploitation alliances. The performance 
implication of strategic decision is an important element in the literature of strategic management 
research. However, research on the performance implications of exploration and exploitation 
alliances has been scant (Lavie et al., 2010). It is meaningful to study their consequences to 
provide insights and guidance for practice. For instance, when will exploration and exploitation 
alliances generate superior performance? How could firms balance between these two choices to 
achieve better performance? It is worth emphasizing that scholars need to carefully define the 
concepts and the applied contexts of their studies to prevent misleading prescriptions.  
 Finally, this study is context specific and future research could extend the study to other 
industries. I chose biopharmaceutical industry as the research setting for its unique 
characteristics, including intense resource commitment in innovation and exploration, high 
environmental uncertainty, and heavy regulation. Given that the findings have suggested some 
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consistent patterns found in prior research of similar contexts, the generalization of the findings 
could likely be applied in some high-tech industries with similar characteristics. More evidences 
from other distinctive contexts could better our understanding of organizational exploration and 
exploitation behavior. 
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3. Chapter Three: Alliance Ambidexterity and Firm Performance: 
Managing Exploration and Exploitation Alliances 
3.1 Introduction  
 Rooted in the literature of organizational action, scholars have been studying exploration 
and exploitation as adaptive processes of organizations (Holland, 1975; Schumpeter, 1934). Both 
activities are considered critical elements for a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage, yet are 
acknowledged to be two conceptually distinctive constructs in current literature. Scholars have 
pointed out that carrying out these two activities entails substantially different organization 
structures, processes, and resources (e.g., He & Wong, 2004; Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006; March, 1991). In particular, exploration is argued to be associated with 
organic structures, loosely coupled systems, flexibility and change. Exploitation, in contrast, is 
considered to be associated with mechanistic structures, tightly coupled systems, routinzation, 
stability and inertia (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Lavie et al., 2010; Lewin, Long, & Carroll, 
1999). Besides, exploitation and exploration generate diverging outcomes such that exploration 
generates greater performance variation, whereas exploitation yields more stable outcome 
(March 1991). The trade-off between them indicates that exploration and exploitation compete 
for limited organizational resources (March 1991). Earlier research considers it a dilemma 
(Smith & Lewis, 2011) and splits opinions on whether exploitation or exploration is more 
desirable. For example, exploitative search is argued to contribute to internal accumulation of 
strategic knowledge and asset stocks (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) which becomes a source of firm’s 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1992). In contrast, exploration allows a 
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firm to move beyond local search and to reconfigure its knowledge base, which is critical to 
create sustainable competitive advantage (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Teece et al., 1997). As 
such, organizations usually need to make choices between exploitation and exploration, yielding 
different performance implications. 
 The distinctive characteristics associated with exploration and exploitation posit a 
challenge for organizational decision making as to how to invest in different types of activities 
(He & Wong, 2004). However, despite that exploration and exploitation entails conflicting 
strategies, recent research has been increasingly emphasizing organizations’ dual orientation and 
that the overall success depends on exploring and exploiting simultaneously (Cao et al., 2009; 
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004; Lavie et al., 2011; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; 
Smith & Lewis, 2011; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). Scholars have argued that exploration and 
exploitation are mutually reinforcing to facilitate a firm’s long-term success through interwoven 
organizational learning (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; He & Wong, 2004). Exploitation provides 
the foundational knowledge that enhances absorptive capacity and stimulates experimentation, 
leading to more exploration which, in turn, creates more organizational knowledge to exploit 
(Smith & Lewis, 2011). Consequently, an ambidextrous firm that is capable of both exploiting 
existing competencies and exploring new opportunities is argued to be more competitive with 
higher performance (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). This assertion has become a 
general agreement in the literature with plenty of studies examining the performance 
implications of organizations’ dual orientation regarding exploration and exploitation (e.g., Cao 
et al., 2009; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004; Lavie et al., 2011; Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996).  Prior research has advocated that “maintaining an 
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appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation is a primary factor in system survival 
and prosperity” (March, 1991: 71). 
 Although researchers have suggested that an ambidextrous approach is beneficial for firm 
performance, balancing exploration and exploitation has been prevalently argued to be a 
challenge for organizations. Prior research has proposed several approaches in an attempt to 
explain how organizations can successfully achieve a balance between exploration and 
exploitation activities (e.g., Benner & Tushman, 2003; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Lavie et al., 
2011; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). A classic approach is structural ambidexterity where 
organizations manage trade-offs between conflicting demands through structural separation with 
some business units focusing on exploitation and others on exploration (Duncan, 1976; Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004). Another approach is temporal ambidexterity where organizations promote 
either exploration or exploitation temporally and sequentially (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Gulati 
& Puranam, 2009; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). Exploitation pursuits are punctuated by 
periods of exploration such that organizations achieve high levels of both exploration and 
exploitation overtime (Burgelman, 2002; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996; Tushman & Romanelli, 
1985).  In recent years, scholars have proposed a third approach, referred to as contextual 
ambidexterity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Organizational ambidexterity is argued to be 
achieved by building a context that facilitates individual decision making to reach the optimal 
balance of alignment and adaptability. More recently, a fourth approach arises in the strategic 
alliance literature. Domain ambidexterity, proposed by Lavie, Kang and Rosenkopf (2011), 
advocates a balance between exploration and exploitation across different domains to bypass the 
conflicting routines associated with these two activities. They argue that exploration and 
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exploitation across different domains generate less conflicts and resource constrains. 
Consequently, firms can explore in one domain while exploit in another to realize organizational 
ambidexterity.  
 There have been extensive discussions of the merits and constrains of different 
approaches in the literature. One common assumption held in the arguments of various 
approaches is that exploration and exploitation are in tension. Scholars have also been examining 
the different contingencies for the optimal approach.  However, empirical studies have been 
surprisingly inadequate and inconclusive as to how the balance of exploration and exploitation 
influences firm performance (He & Wong, 2004; Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie et al., 2010). Among 
the limited amount of current research, empirical evidence of performance effects has been 
relatively limited to anecdotal case studies (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Tushman & 
O'Reilly, 1996). More research based on large samples is critical to provide more evidences from 
different perspectives. 
 In the literature of strategic alliances, scholars have applied the concepts exploitation and 
exploration to examine alliance ambidexterity. Koza and Lewin (1998) suggested that firms 
establish strategic alliances to jointly exploit existing knowledge or to explore new opportunities. 
Alliances are formed to access markets, develop new products and services, and leverage each 
other’s resources and capabilities (Gulati, 1998; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). For example, UPS 
and Toshiba have collaborated to exploit existing competencies by fine-tuning global supply 
chain operations and streamlining freight movement on the one hand, and to explore innovations 
by co-developing innovative solutions such as repair-and-reverse-logistics-process for laptops on 
the other hand (Hesseldahl, 2004). Although scholars have suggested the importance of 
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understanding the challenges and consequences of exploration and exploitation in strategic 
alliances (Im & Rai, 2008; Koza & Lewin, 1998), ambidexterity in alliance has remained much 
less studied. First, there is limited understanding regarding how exploration and exploitation 
alliances impact firm performance (e.g., Im & Rai, 2008; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). Previous 
studies have argued that exploration and exploitation drive out each other (Benner & Tushman, 
2002, 2003), or reinforce each other (He & Wong, 2004). However, we do not know much about 
the performance implication of exploration and exploitation in the context of strategic alliances. 
Second, firms’ tendencies toward exploration versus exploitation may be driven by various 
triggers such as industry events, leadership changes, or resource constraints (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 
2006; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002; Park et al., 2002). Thus, performance implication of 
ambidexterity approach in alliance formation is contingent on organizational characteristics and 
external conditions (He & Wong, 2004; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, previous findings on alliance ambidexterity have shed little light on contingent 
conditions. Third, the optimal organization designs that facilitate exploration and exploitation in 
strategic alliances have been paid scant attention to (Im & Rai, 2008; Lavie et al., 2011). The 
abovementioned approaches have received scarce empirical examination in strategic alliance 
literature.  For instance, as a recently proposed approach, domain separation has received little 
research attention, with the vast majority of previous research focusing on a single domain. 
However, as argued by Lavie and his colleagues (2011), domain separation is a noteworthy 
approach because “it does not entail separate organizational units with distinctive sets of 
conflicting routines. Instead, it offers flexibility for firms to underscore either exploration or 
exploitation within each domain as long as balance is maintained across domains”. 
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 In an attempt to address some of the above-mentioned research gaps, in this chapter, I 
investigate the balance of exploration and exploitation activities in the context of strategic 
alliance, by focusing on two organizational designs, i.e., temporal separation and domain 
separation. Previous studies have suggested a further examination on the contingencies of 
strategic activities. I therefore consider firm-size an important contingent condition because prior 
research has suggested that firm size is an indicator of a firm’s available resources and 
capabilities, which are pivotal in the strategic choice between exploration and exploitation. In the 
following sections, I will present the theoretical background and hypotheses, followed by method 
and analysis, and conclude with a discussion.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Balancing Exploration and Exploitation in Alliances 
It has been prevalently established in the literature that firms need both exploration and 
exploitation to sustain longevity, despite that these two activities are in tension. An optimal level 
of the combination of exploration and exploitation is desirable, whereas over-exploration or 
over-exploitation impedes long-term performance (Wang & Li, 2008). Research has indicated 
that firms relying on excessive exploitation tend to have difficulty in maintaining their leadership 
positions in the industry (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997), whereas excessive exploration could also 
hurt firm performance (Wang & Li, 2008). Maintaining an ambidexterity of exploration and 
exploitation allows firms to leverage the synergy of the unused potential of both activities thus 
increases subsequent performance (Jansen et al., 2012). For instance, when a firm regularly 
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makes adaptations to existing products and also develops new products, it tends to benefit from 
both the increasing market share of existing markets and the creation of new revenue sources 
generated from new product development, leading to enhanced performance (Jansen et al., 
2012). 
However, the joint pursuit of exploration and exploitation is inherently challenging. It is 
assumed in the literature that firms ought to maintain a balance between exploration and 
exploitation in order to achieve performance enhancement (Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009). As 
pointed out by Levinthal and March (1993, p. 105), “the basic problem confronting an 
organization is to engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure its current viability and, at the same 
time, to devote enough energy to exploration to ensure its future viability.” Nevertheless, they 
also suggested that “the precise mix of exploitation and exploration that is optimal is hard to 
specify”. Hence, in this study, I do not define balance strictly as an equal split between 
exploration and exploitation. Instead, a balance between exploration and exploitation represents 
sufficient engagement in both activities which will potentially facilitate firm performance. The 
difficulty of finding and maintaining a balance between exploration and exploitation is 
acknowledged in the literature and scholars have provided guidance on how to reconcile the 
inherent tensions between them (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Lavie et al., 2011; Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). One of the approaches that have received limited empirical examination is 
the temporal approach, which may also be referred to as ‘organizational vacillation’ 
(Boumgarden et al., 2012), or ‘temporal separation’ balance (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). This 
approach entails dynamically oscillating between exploration and exploitation over time to 
achieve high levels of both exploration and exploitation (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Gulati & 
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Puranam, 2009; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). It asserts that by 
sequentially alternating between the focus of exploration and exploitation rather than promoting 
both of them simultaneously through dual structures, organizations could better avoid the 
conflicting routines and resource constrains of a dual-structure design (Boumgarden et al., 2012). 
However, despite the theoretical development, few studies have empirically examined the impact 
of temporal balance which demands more research efforts.   
Another approach, the domain balance (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006), arises from the 
literature of strategic alliance. Prior research on alliance ambidexterity mainly distinguishes 
between exploration alliances and exploitation alliances based on the value chain function (e.g., 
Park et al., 2002; Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Firms are considered to 
engage in exploration alliances in the function domain if the alliances are formed with partners to 
collaborate on upstream activities such as R&D initiatives. In contrast, exploitation alliances are 
formed for performing downstream activities of the value chain, such as commercialization of 
existing technologies. Therefore exploration alliances are associated with joint efforts of new 
technology and knowledge exploration in the upstream of value chain and exploitation alliances 
are tied to marketing and production cooperation in the downstream of value chain to leverage 
and integrate existing knowledge (e.g., Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Park et al., 2002; Rothaermel, 
2001; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). However, the alliance literature has suggested more than one 
domain of activities. Structure domain which refers to explore new ties or exploit existing ties by 
discretely selecting alliance partners allows a firm to manage and leverage the structure of its 
alliance portfolio (e.g., Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin et al., 2007). Exploration alliances in 
structure domain present new opportunities by collaborating with new partners who possess fresh 
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resources and knowledge bases (Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). In contrast, 
exploitation alliances in structure domain allow a firm to work with already acquainted partners 
with accumulated trust and reliability, thus reinforcing its knowledge base (Baum, Rowley, 
Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Beckman et al., 2004; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). Despite the 
theoretical assertion that a firm’s tendencies toward exploration versus exploitation alliances can 
take the form in both function and structure domains, very few studies have so far examined the 
performance implications of a ‘domain balance’, i.e., balancing exploration and exploitation 
alliances within and across these domains (Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). 
Furthermore, current research has been studying the impact of ambidexterity of 
exploration and exploitation activities on firm performance in a variety of contexts using 
different research methods, yielding inconsistent findings  (He & Wong, 2004). For example, 
based on several case studies, Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) suggested that firms may not be 
able to manage ambidexterity successfully because the inherent tensions between the two are too 
difficult to reconcile. They argued that, essentially, exploration and exploitation entail 
fundamentally different logics and require distinctive strategies and organizational structures. In 
contrast, Knott (2002) found that Toyota was able to leverage the complementarity of 
exploration and exploitation which co-existed in its product development process. Other studies 
(e.g., Bierly & Daly, 2001) examining the impact of ambidexterity on firm performance, 
however, found no significant results. Even fewer studies have formally investigated the 
‘balance’ between exploration and exploitation and its impact on firm performance. He and 
Wong (2004) examined how exploration and exploitation can jointly influence firm performance 
and found that their interaction enhanced sale growth rate, and that relative imbalance between 
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explorative and exploitative innovation strategies is detrimental to sales growth. Cao, Gedajlovic, 
and Zhang (2009) examined these two concepts by unpacking them into two dimensions: the 
balance dimension and the combined dimension. They found that both a balance between 
exploration and exploitation, and a combination of them have positive effects. The author also 
suggested that concurrent high levels of a balance and a combination yield synergistic benefits. 
Besides, a balance is more beneficial to resource-constrained firms, whereas a combination is 
more beneficial to firms with more resources. Lavie, Kang and Rosenkopf (2011), however, 
suggested that firms did not benefit from balancing exploration and exploitation within the 
function domain and structure domain respectively. But those balancing exploration and 
exploitation across these domains gain in profits and market value. In addition, larger firms 
amplify the benefits of balance across domains and the costs of balance within domains.  
Overall, current research in balancing exploration and exploitation activities, especially in 
the context of strategic alliances, has been very limited and the empirical evidences provided 
have been far beyond conclusive. The confounding findings could be attributed to the approaches 
engaged, the contexts studies, as well as the industries examined. Firm- and industry-level 
attributes may predict the optimal level of balance (Wang & Li, 2008). Therefore, in an attempt 
to provide more evidences to the existing research stream, I investigate the balance of 
exploration and exploitation in the context of strategic alliances by embracing two approaches, 
i.e., temporal balance and domain balance. 
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3.2.2 Performance Implications of Balance within Domains 
It has been generally accepted in the literature that exploration and exploitation are both 
essential for organizational performance (e.g., Boumgarden et al., 2012; Im & Rai, 2008; Lavie 
et al., 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). Exploitation allows firms to leverage existing 
knowledge and capabilities, whereas exploration enables firms to create new knowledge and 
opportunities. Furthermore, exploration and exploitation activities may reinforce each other to 
generate synergy and to enhance firm performance (Im & Rai, 2008). In a similar vein, 
exploration alliances and exploitation alliances could potentially benefit firm performance by 
allowing a firm to discover new opportunities or leverage existing competencies beyond its 
boundary (Koza & Lewin, 1998). Given the distinctive merits associated with exploration and 
exploitation activities, prior research has suggested that a balance between exploration and 
exploitation activities can help organizations achieve optimal performance (He & Wong, 2004; 
Uotila et al., 2009). An overwhelming emphasis on either exploration or exploitation would 
result in undeveloped ideas and missed opportunities or existing competencies obsolete (March, 
1991). A balanced mix with both sufficient exploration and sufficient exploitation is the key to 
short-term and long-term success (March, 1991).  
 Nevertheless, exploration activities and exploitation activities entail inherently 
conflicting routines and trade-offs (Lavie et al., 2011). Research has indicated that exploration 
and exploitation rely on distinctive design elements, organizational processes, and operating 
routines (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Lavie et al., 2011; March, 1991). Essentially, it has been 
commonly argued in the literature that it takes a mechanistic and centralized organizational 
structure to promote exploitation, whereas an organic and decentralized structure is required to 
89 
 
promote exploration (Boumgarden et al., 2012; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Thompson, 1967). 
Given the inherent conflicting nature of organizational design elements demanded by 
exploitation and exploration respectively, organizations could encounter organizational costs and 
incongruities (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Lavie et al., 2011). There are three folds of interrelated 
reasons arising from the tension between exploitation and exploration that can impair firm 
performance. First, exploitation and exploration are often at odds (Lavie et al., 2011). They 
represent distinctive strategic choices and orientations of organizations, and demand different 
organizational structures, resulting in strategic contradiction. As March (1991) has argued, both 
exploration and exploitation are self-reinforcing. Organizations that have accumulated 
substantial experience in either exploitation or exploration tend to engage in more existing 
knowledge leverage or new opportunity discoveries. Due to the self-reinforcing nature, 
exploitation and exploration tend to crowd each other out (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 
1991).  It is therefore challenging to reconcile the tension and conflicting routines between 
exploration and exploitation (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). Second, it is argued that organizations 
encounter various costs associated with the configuration and maintenance of different 
organizational structures and design elements simultaneously (Boumgarden et al., 2012). Setup 
costs, administrative costs and costs of negative externality are the typical ones faced by 
ambidextrous organizations. Scholars claiming that ambidexterity leads to high performance 
implicitly assume that these costs do not significantly impair performance, which may not be 
upheld in all conditions. For example, the magnitude of negative externality could be 
substantially high given that ambidexterity is fundamentally against the notion of internal 
consistency in organizational design, rendering lower levels of organizational performance (Van 
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Looy, Martens, & Debackere, 2005). Third, scarcity of resources within organizations imposes 
further constraints on ambidexterity (March, 1991). The simultaneous pursuit of exploration and 
exploitation requires abundant resources to support the high level performance of both activities. 
Organizations with limited amount of resources often experience trade-offs when they strive to 
balance exploration and exploitation at the same time. Competition for scarce resource can be 
detrimental to firm performance (Lavie et al., 2011).  
 Strategic alliances are formed by organizations to access resources and knowledge 
beyond their organizational boundaries which are usually unavailable from within. Depending on 
a firm’s strategic intent, organizational learning, or its expected returns, a firm may choose 
between exploration and exploitation in alliance formation (Koza & Lewin, 1998). It is argued 
that in the context of alliances, firms experience similar tension when they attempt to balance 
exploration and exploitation activities in their alliance portfolios (Lavie et al., 2011). 
Organizational conflicts, negative externality, and resource allocation constraints shift from 
internal organization structures to alliance organization. Despite respective merits of exploration 
and exploitation alliances, however, balancing exploration and exploitation within domains 
demands the management of trade-offs and conflicting routines (Lavie et al., 2011). Balancing 
exploration and exploitation in alliance portfolio takes substantial operational resources. For 
example, within the function domain, exploration alliance tends to require high-risk investments 
in uncertain new technologies, while exploitation alliance needs financial capital for product 
commercialization and marketing. The trade-offs of resource allocation may diminish the 
effectiveness of the alliances. In addition, exploration alliances and exploitation alliances entail 
different and even conflicting search routines and processes, leading to organizational 
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inconsistencies when firms seek to balance them. The lack of a dominant logic can undermine 
the effectiveness of both types of alliances (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Recent empirical studies 
have provided evidences supporting this line of reasoning, as opposed to the balance declaim of 
simultaneous ambidexterity. For example, Lavie et al. (2011) studied the alliance portfolios of 
software firms and found that firm performance was negatively associated with a balance 
between exploration and exploitation alliance formation decisions. They demonstrated that firms 
do not typically benefit from such a balance within the function domain (technology versus 
marketing alliances) and structure domain (new versus prior partners). Based on an empirical 
study of five U.S. industries spanning eight years, Lin, Yang and Demirkan (2007) initially 
proposed a positive effect of balance between exploration and exploitation alliances on firm 
performance, yet their empirical result suggested the opposite effect. Their findings indicated 
that a mere pursuit of ambidexterity in alliance formation could actually hurt firm performance. 
Therefore, based on the above argument, I hypothesize that: 
H1. At one static point of time, performance is likely to increase when a firm 
focuses on either exploration alliances or exploitation alliances. 
 
3.2.3 Performance Implications of Temporal Balance 
The majority of organizational ambidexterity research views ambidexterity as the 
simultaneous pursuit of both exploration and exploitation by adopting certain organizational 
configurations at one static point of time (Gupta et al., 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Raisch 
et al., 2009). However, some scholars have argued that achieving ambidexterity is a dynamic 
process rather than static configurations and suggested that firms should vacillate through 
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periods of exploitation and exploration temporally (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Nickerson 
& Zenger, 2002; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Raisch et al., 2009; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 
2003; Venkatraman, Lee, & Iyer, 2007).  The temporal balance approach regards the 
organization as a coherent system and proposes that, due to bounded rationality and sequential 
attention to divergent goals (Cyert & March, 1963), organizations can achieve ambidexterity by 
focusing on exploration at one point of time and exploitation at another (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997). Introducing the temporal lens to organizational ambidexterity research allows for a deeper 
examination of the dynamic processes (Raisch et al., 2009).  
Previous research has suggested two sets of benefits associated with a temporal balance 
of exploration and exploitation. First, as argued before, exploitation and exploration generate 
resource allocation trade-offs and conflicting routines, especially when firms pursue them 
simultaneously. Resource allocation trade-offs between exploitation and exploration activities as 
well as disruptions as a result of conflicting operation routines could lead to inferior performance 
(e.g., Lavie et al., 2010; Piao, 2010). A simultaneous pursuit of ambidexterity translates into 
contemporaneous resource sharing between exploitation and exploration. The tension gets 
accentuated when exploitation and exploration projects compete for scarce resources to obtain 
sufficient resources that are needed for them to survive and thrive. Consequently, firms pay a 
price for attempting to balance exploitation and exploration simultaneously. In contrast, a 
temporal balance by gradually shifting from one learning activity to the other can mitigate the 
tension and conflicts (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Piao, 2010). On the 
one hand, a “sequential ambidexterity” of exploitation and exploration makes it possible for 
firms to spare more resources for a relative focused exploitation or exploration at certain point of 
93 
 
time without a high degree of tension invoked; on the other hand, firms are able to focus on one 
activity at a time with a lesser degree of interruption imposed by the other (Piao, 2010). As a 
result, firms can achieve a high level of both exploitation and exploration over time. Second, a 
temporal balance of exploitation and exploration can reinforce each other. At a static point of 
time, organizational resources are fixed. However, over time, organizational resources would 
change such that exploitation can produce resources that can be invested in future exploration 
and vice versa (Lavie et al., 2010). By implementing either exploration or exploitation 
effectively, firms can generate and accumulate sufficient resources for the next stage of strategic 
focus when they diligently shift their orientation. For example, a successful commercialization of 
products (i.e., exploitation) can provide financial and knowledge base for future new product 
development (i.e., exploration). The mutual reinforcement nature of exploitation and exploration 
over time could potentially enhance firm performance (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lavie et al., 
2010; Piao, 2010).      
             Strategic alliance formation is regarded as a process of dynamic evolution (Dyer & 
Nobeoka, 2000). Over time, inter-organizational relationships become strengthened, weakened, 
or altered, as opposed to remaining static. Scholars have emphasized the importance of dynamic 
adaptation and evolution of inter-organizational relationships so as to avoid inertia buildup and 
failure of these relationships, as well as to maintain the viability of a firm’s strategic networks 
(Doz, 1996; Madhavan, Koka, & Prescott, 1998). In accordance with this dynamic perspective of 
strategic alliance formation, the temporal balance serves well in shaping the dynamism of a 
firm’s alliance portfolio. Within each domain, firms can balance exploration and exploitation 
over time by sequentially shifting their tendencies to explore or to exploit to avoid resource 
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allocation trade-offs and conflicting routines (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). For example, within 
the function domain, firms that have primarily engaged in R&D collaboration to explore new 
product and opportunities may shift their focus later on to establish more commercialization and 
marketing alliances to exploit the already-developed new products. In turn, firms that have 
engaged in exploitation alliances can gradually adjust their emphasis to more exploration 
alliances for sustainability and longevity. In a similar vein, within the structure domain, firms 
that have engaged in alliances with recurrent partners may reach a point that they have fully 
leveraged the existing relationships and start to explore new partnering opportunities. When 
firms have accumulated sufficient diverse partners in their alliance portfolios, they can again 
begin to form recurrent alliances with selected partners to leverage the existing collaborations. 
Despite that some scholars have shed light on the theoretical development of temporal balance, 
there has been rather scarcity of empirical studies investigating its impact. Boumgarden et al. 
(2012) studies two approaches for achieving simultaneously high levels of exploration and 
exploitation: organizational ambidexterity and organizational vacillation. Based on the analysis 
of two canonical cases, this paper suggests that vacillation may offer higher long run 
performance than ambidexterity, while ambidexterity enhances performance on the margin when 
utilized within larger epochs of vacillation. Piao (2010) studies the temporal balance of 
exploration and exploitation. An analysis of 1980-1999 data from the hard disk drive industry 
suggests that exploitation to the exclusion of exploration generally undermines firms’ long-term 
viability. A moderate level of temporal overlap between exploitation and exploration processes 
enables a firm to extend its longevity. The limited amount of empirical research tends to lend 
support to the merits of a temporal balance. I thus propose the following hypothesis:  
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H2. Over time, firm performance is likely to increase when a firm balances 
exploration and exploitation of alliance formation decisions temporally. 
 
3.2.4 Performance Implications of Balance across Domains 
 Balance exploitation and exploration within domains simultaneously has been argued to 
incur inherent trade-offs, conflicting routines, and negative externality. Besides the temporal 
balance to separate the tendencies to explore or to exploit over time, Lavie and his colleagues 
(Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006) have proposed another approach, i.e., balancing 
both activities across domains, which is particularly applicable in the context of strategic 
alliances. According to the domain separation approach (Lavie et al., 2011), the inherent 
organizational trade-offs and impediments can be circumvented by balancing exploration and 
exploitation activities across domains, whereas the benefits of such a balance remains. To 
achieve a balance across domains, scholars have argued that, firms can explore in the function 
domain while exploit in the structure domain, or exploit in the function domain when explore in 
the structure domain (Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). For instance, a firm can 
form R&D alliances (function exploration) with recurrent partners that they are familiar with 
(structure exploitation), or engage in marketing alliances (function exploitation) with new 
partners (structure exploration).  
 On the one hand, it is argued that balancing exploitation and exploration across domains 
can help firms overcome the inherent conflicts and trade-offs (Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). The inconsistent and conflicting routines and resource allocation trade-offs 
associated with exploitation and exploration suggested in previous literature primarily occur 
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within domains. For example, attempt to conduct market research and to promote market 
coverage of existing products is in tension with efforts to research and develop new products. 
However, it is likely that firms can support exploitation in one domain and exploration in another 
simultaneously without incurring such tensions because exploitation and exploration in function 
domain and structure domain are conceptually independent (Lavie et al., 2011), therefore the 
routines and heuristics associated with exploitation and exploration within each domain are 
independent. A firm’s pursuit of new technology and product development in R&D alliances 
does not counter its reliance on current partnering routines such as developing inter-firm trust 
and informal governance mechanisms. Firms can use relatively consistent routines for managing 
its alliance portfolio within each domain (Lavie et al., 2011). Consequently, such a balance can 
eliminate certain organizational conflicts and trade-offs, as well as diminish the corresponding 
organizational costs. On the other hand, balancing exploitation and exploration across domains 
still generates substantial benefits attributed to ambidexterity. In this regard, a firm can generate 
new knowledge as well as leverage established heuristics and effective governance mechanisms 
simultaneously (Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). A combination of function 
exploration and structure exploitation, e.g., forming R&D alliances with recurrent partners, 
allows a firm to focus on innovation and new technology exploration by collaborating with 
familiar partners. Given the inherent uncertainty of new technology exploration, it is critical that 
collaboration with existing partners frees a firm from dealing with the uncertainty and frictions 
of working with unfamiliar or new partners. Familiarity, mutual trust fostered from previous 
collaborations, and established partnering routines are likely to facilitate the exploration 
endeavors and enhance performance. Alternatively, engaging in function exploitation and 
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structure exploration, e.g., forming marketing or licensing alliances with new partners, offers 
market variance and potentially new market penetration while allows a firm to leverage its 
existing product base. Exploring new partnership in the quest of market extension of existing 
products adds value to the function exploitation because repeated alliances with prior partners 
can only provide limited and perhaps saturated market access. Empirical studies have just started 
to investigate this approach. Lavie et al. (2011) studied U.S.-based firms in the software industry 
and found that balancing exploration and exploitation across domains enhanced profitability and 
market value. Based on the above argument, I therefore hypothesize:  
H3. At one static point of time, a firm is likely to increase its performance when it 
balances exploration and exploitation across the function-based and structure-
based domains of alliance formation decisions. 
 
3.2.5 Moderating Effects of Firm Size 
As argued before, firms generally strive to engage in both exploitation and exploration 
activities in order to benefit from short-term and long-term performance enhancement attributed 
to them respectively. However, resource allocation trade-offs and internal conflicts arise when 
firms seek a balance. Scholars have argued for the importance of contingency conditions that 
could affect the performance implications of organizational ambidexterity (Lin et al., 2007). One 
of the contingency factors that is of high importance is resource munificence (e.g., Jansen et al., 
2012). To successfully implement and leverage both exploitation and exploration, a firm needs to 
be able to invest sufficient and diverse resources in a timely manner. The munificence of 
organizational resources could potentially impose a significant influence on the relationship 
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between ambidexterity and performance such that a munificent context may mitigate resource 
constraints and trade-offs as well as conflicting routines imposed by ambidexterity (Aiken & 
Hage, 1968; Jansen et al., 2012; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). Firms would be able to more 
effectively manage and leverage both exploitation and exploration. To the contrary, the lack of a 
munificent context may accentuate the tension of ambidexterity, thus pushing firms towards 
alternative ways to balance exploitation and exploration.  
Strategic alliances serve as an alternative source for firms to access resources that may 
not be available internally. Firms may establish alliances with partners to collaborate on 
exploitative marketing activities and/or explorative R&D activities, as well as to leverage 
existing and new social capital (Lavie et al., 2011). Despite that alliances may provide additional 
resources to a firm, it will encounter similar tensions of resource allocation trade-offs and 
conflicting routines associated with engaging and managing multiple alliance activities. 
Consequently, a munificent context is necessary for successfully carrying out a variety of 
strategic alliances. In general, the size of a firm is positively related to the amount of resource 
endowment it holds internally. As a firm grows, it accumulates more organizational resources 
and expands in structure. Hence a large firm is relatively less resource constrained. In contrast, a 
small firm relies on strategic alliances to a greater extent, while facing intensified tensions of 
ambidexterity (Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). With a limited resource base, a 
small firm is likely to experience intensified competition for resources within domains which are 
required to support exploitation and exploration alliance activities effectively. In order to ensure 
the expected performance rather than to be ‘stuck in the middle’, it may be forced to invest in a 
certain type of alliance activities as opposed to scattering the resources. Besides, a small firm’s 
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organizational structure does not grant generous space for managing conflicting routines 
attributed to exploitation and exploration. It is more difficult for a small firm to digest different 
organizational logics and to cope with the internal inconsistency. Furthermore, a small firm tends 
to be less capable of mitigating negative externality arising from organizational ambidexterity 
bounded by their limited endowment. Therefore, at one static point of time, given the limited 
resource base a small firm has, it is critical for the firm to make wise decisions regarding alliance 
formation. It is highly likely that a small firm is not capable of supporting both exploration and 
exploitation alliance activities at the same time. As such, it is particularly critical for smaller 
firms to take on a focused strategic choice by engaging primarily in exploration alliances or 
exploitation alliances within domains.  
              Although in the above paragraph I argued that smaller firms would particularly benefit 
from a focused strategy in alliance formation at one static point of time, it does not suggest that 
smaller firms shall only focus on either exploration alliances or exploitation alliances. Both 
exploitation and exploration are essential for short-term and long-term performance, regardless 
of firm size. Therefore, in order to survive and thrive in the long run, I argue that a temporal 
balance or a balance across domains is particularly beneficial for smaller firms to achieve 
ambidexterity. A small firm is generally not well positioned to engage in both activities at the 
same time, given the conflicting organizational requirements entailed as well as the trade-offs 
between them. With limited amount of resources, it is in a small firm’s best interest to invest in 
one type of activities at one time then shift to the other later on. A temporal balance allows it to 
make the best use of its resources and leverage the benefits of both exploration and exploitation 
alliance activities. Compared to a large firm, a small firm functions more as a coherent entity. To 
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avoid the liability of being ‘stuck-in-the-middle’ and to maximize returns, a small firm with 
constraining organizational context may pool its resources and attention on one activity at a time 
(Jansen et al., 2012). For example, it can focus on working with partners to develop new 
technology and products then shift to collaboration with partners who can help with 
commercialization and marketing. A small firm can also extensively explore new partnerships at 
one time to allow more opportunities and intensively work with familiar partners at another. The 
stage of exploitation alliances may provide smaller firms a period of stability and a break from 
exploration uncertainty, which allows them to digest technology and social capital exploration 
and at the same time accumulate resources to reinforce future exploration. In a similar vein, 
balancing exploitation alliances and exploration alliances across domains will benefit smaller 
firms to a greater extent. For smaller firms, it is more important to avoid resource trade-offs and 
incurring additional organizational costs by exploring in one domain while exploiting in another. 
Besides, a small firm’s condensed administrative structure better supports one set of operating 
and partnering routines at a given time. Engaging in R&D alliances (function exploration) with 
recurrent partners (structure exploitation) enables a small firm to focus its attention on exploring 
new technology while relying on partners with higher level of trust and smoother collaboration, 
diminishing uncertainty and the liability of smallness faced by smaller firms. Alternatively, 
forming marketing or commercialization alliances (function exploitation) with a variety of new 
partners (structure exploration) may offer small firms opportunities for new market exploration 
by exploring heterogeneous social capital, which are beyond small firms’ capability and 
accessibility as compared to larger firms. As a result, the above argument leads to the following 
hypotheses:  
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H4. At one static point of time, firm size affects the performance implication of 
exploitation-exploration balance such that it is more beneficial for a small firm to 
focus on either exploration alliances or exploitation alliances.  
 
H5. Over time, firm size affects the performance implication of temporal 
exploitation-exploration balance such that it is more beneficial for a small firm to 
balance exploration and exploitation of alliance formation decisions temporally. 
 
H6. At one static point of time, firm size affects the performance implication of 
exploitation-exploration balance across domains such that it is more beneficial 
for a small firm to balance exploration and exploitation across the function-based 
and structure-based domains of alliance formation decisions. 
 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Research Setting 
 This study was designed as a pooled time series analysis of alliances formed by high-
technology firms in U.S., including five industries (i.e., biotechnology, computer hardware and 
software, telecommunication, semiconductor, and electronics). High-technology industry offers 
an appropriate setting because in these industries, the high level of innovative activities and the 
commercialization of technology are characterized by intensive alliance relations (Rothaermeli & 
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Boeker, 2008). The intensity of alliance also accounts for a high proportion of the observed 
strategic alliances in high-technology industries (Hagedoorn, 1993).  
 This study’s time frame spanned the years 1985 to 2009. Prior work employing the same 
time frame suggests that a 25-year period serves well in capturing the upturns and downturns in 
the growth of the high-tech industries (e.g., Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). In addition, previous 
research studying alliances also sets 1985 as a base year or the starting year (e.g., Beckman et al., 
2004; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006) and prior studies suggested that there were much fewer 
alliances formed in this industry before 1985. Alliances formed after 1985 therefore represent a 
sufficient and viable pool for this study. The sample included 905 publicly traded United States-
based high-technology firms that have records in both Securities Data Corporation (SDC) and 
COMPUSTAT datasets. In total, 4,617 alliances were identified between 1985 and 2009, and the 
number of alliances formed by a focal firm ranged between 1 alliance to 86 alliances in a given 
year, with an average of 2.54 alliances per firm-year.   
 
3.3.2 Data Collection 
 The bulk of the data on alliances was retrieved from the SDC database. The SDC 
database is one of the most commonly used and comprehensive alliance databases (Schilling, 
2009). A great amount of previous studies have used the SDC database for strategic alliance 
research. To increase the reliability of SDC records, the alliance data was verified and corrected 
through crosschecking the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, the Bloomberg 
database, and corporate websites. Relying on multiple sources therefore enhanced the validity of 
the alliance data. Overall, I identified 4,617 alliances formed by 905 focal firms within the five 
103 
 
high-technology industries. Firm-specific data, such as total assets, R&D expenses, net income, 
and retained earnings, were extracted from COMPUSTAT database.  
 To match the data from the SDC database and the COMPUSTAT database, I took several 
steps. First, I compared and matched the CUSIP codes in both databases. CUSIP code in SDC is 
recorded in 6 digits whereas that in COMPUSTAT is in 9 digits. I extracted all 9-digit CUSIP 
codes of firms and the SIC codes of all firms in the five high-technology industries from 
COMPUSTAT; then I identified those firms whose first 6 digits of COMPUSAT CUSIP codes 
were the same as SDC CUSIP codes. All matched records were then included in the sample for 
further analysis. The unit of analysis in this study is firm-year; therefore I transformed the data to 
firm-year observations by pooling the data across all alliances formed by each focal firm in a 
given year, yielding 2,300 firm-year observations. In the regression models, 1,961 valid firm-
year observations were included for analysis due to missing data.  
 
3.3.3 Measures 
 As two key constructs in this study, exploration alliance and exploitation alliance were 
measured following previous studies and constructed by counting the number of exploration 
alliances or exploitation alliances for each sampled firm in a given year.  
 Function exploration alliances and exploitation alliances. Following previous research 
(e.g., Koza & Lewin, 1998; Lavie et al., 2011; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), I coded exploration 
and exploitation alliances by considering the nature of the alliance activity. Those focusing on 
basic research, new product discovery and development were coded as exploration alliances. The 
following is an example of an alliance announcement I coded as exploration: 
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August 30, 1988 - Calgene and Campbell Soup Co. signed an agreement to jointly 
develop a genetically-engineered gene for fresh tomatoes. The two companies 
developed an antisense polygalacturonase gene, which suppressed the levels of 
polygalacturonase in tomatoes, thereby reducing pectin degradation and fruit 
softening. This "Flavr Savr" gene prolonged shelf life, enhanced resistance to post-
harvest disease, and also allowed the tomatoes to better survive handling during 
shipments. 
 Alliances that were associated with commercialization or downstream activities on the 
value chain, such as clinical trials, licensing, marketing and sales, were classified as exploitation 
alliances. An example of exploitation alliance is as following: 
December 31, 1989-Cambridge Biotech Corp and Diagnostics Pasteur signed a cross 
licensing agreement which granted each other access to each participant's AIDS and 
HTLV-1 antibody diagnostics. 
 Structure exploration alliance and exploitation alliances. Based on the argument of Lavie 
and Rosenkopf (2006), I focus on whether the partner is an old one or a new one in the year of 
alliance formation. An alliance is structure exploratory when it is established with a new partner 
that the focal firm has never formed alliances with before, and structure exploitative otherwise. I 
operationalized it by following the measures used in the work of Lavie, Kang, and Rosenkopf 
(2011). I coded each alliance formed by the focal firm such that a value of 1 was given to an 
indicator for exploration if the firm had no prior alliances with its partner and a value of 1 was 
given to another indicator for exploitation if they had prior collaboration. Then structure 
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exploration alliances or exploitations alliance was calculated as the total number of its indicator 
across all alliances formed by the focal firm in a given year.  
 Balance within domains. Previous research studying the balance of exploration and 
exploitation generally suggests two approaches to measure this construct: the absolute difference 
(Cao et al., 2009; He & Wong, 2004) and the curvilinear approach (Lavie et al., 2011). The 
curvilinear approach models the square term of exploration and tests its influence on 
performance. It is difficult to determine the ‘balance point’ because the inflexion point might not 
necessarily be 0.5. Besides, the actual value range of exploration may fall out of the interval of 
effective curve. Therefore, I followed the first approach and measured the balance between 
exploration and exploitation within function and structure domain by calculating the absolute 
value of the difference between exploration alliances and exploitation alliances. I first calculated 
the portion of function/structure exploration and exploitation through dividing the number of 
exploration or exploitation alliances by the total number of alliances formed by a firm in a given 
year. Then I calculated the absolute value of the difference between them. A higher value 
indicates a higher unbalance between exploration and exploitation, and that a firm is dominantly 
engaging in either exploration or exploitation alliances. The absolute difference of function 
balance ranges between 0 and 1, with an average of 0.80. The absolute difference of structure 
balance ranges between 0 and 1, with an average of 0.97.  
 Temporal balance. There have been a rather limited amount of studies that empirically 
examine the temporal transition between exploration and exploitation activities in previous 
research. Employing quantitative method to examine temporal balance has been 
methodologically challenging, rendering little research endeavor. Some scholars investigated this 
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topic qualitatively. For example, Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) employed a case-study approach 
to examine organizational change over time. To the best of my knowledge, no existing research 
has empirically investigated the temporal balance in the context of strategic alliance, leaving 
little reference, if not none, for measuring this construct. To account for the oscillating strategy 
of firms in managing their exploration versus exploitation alliance portfolios, I observed the 
change of a firm’s balance strategy longitudinally. For example, a firm may emphasize 
exploration alliances in a given year and shift to focus more on exploitation alliances in a later 
year. If this is the case, it temporally balances its focus on exploration or exploitation over time. 
Accordingly, temporal balance was operationalized by calculating the absolute value of the 
difference between the the value of within-domain (function domain or structure domain) 
exploration percentage (i.e., the number of exploration alliances divided by the total number of 
alliances) in a given year and the corresponding value in the nearest proceeded year when the 
focal firm had a record of forming alliances. For instance, if a firm was engaging dominantly in 
exploration (or exploitation) alliances in a given year and shifted to a higher proportion of 
exploitation (or exploration) alliances constructed in its alliance portfolio in a later year, the 
absolute value of the percentage difference between these two years indicates a change of focus 
over time. A higher temporal balance indicates a greater shift of a firm’s exploration or 
exploitation alliance focus over time. That is to say, for example, in a proceeded year, a firm 
primarily formed exploration alliances, and in a later year, it engaged in more exploitation 
alliances. The absolute difference of temporal function balance ranges between 0 and 1, with an 
average of 0.48. The absolute difference of temporal structure balance ranges between 0 and 1, 
with an average of 0.42.  
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 Balance across domains. As a recently proposed approach by Lavie and Rosenkopf 
(2006), there has been only one study applying this approach so far (Lavie et al., 2011). In their 
work, Lavie and his colleagues did not operationalize it as a separate construct. Instead, they 
tested the interaction of within-domain balances (i.e., the interaction between function-domain 
balance and structure-domain balance) to investigate whether one would moderate the other’s 
impact on performance. To avoid the potential confounding impact, I created a construct to 
capture the balance of exploration and exploitation alliances across domains. I operationalized 
across-domain balance by calculating the standard deviation of function exploration and 
structure exploration of a focal firm in a given year. If a firm forms a high level of both function 
exploration (or exploitation) alliances and structure exploration (or exploitation) alliances, the 
standard deviation between them will be low. In contrast, a higher standard deviation indicates 
that a firm is either engaging in both a high level of function exploration alliance and a high level 
of structure exploitation alliance, or a high level of function exploitation alliance and a high level 
of structure exploration alliance. In other words, a firm is relatively balancing exploitation and 
exploration across function and structure domains.  
 Firm Size. Firm size has been examined in previous studies with mixed findings 
regarding its impact on the tendency to explore versus exploit (Beckman et al., 2004; Lavie et al., 
2010; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Following previous studies, I measured firm size as the value 
of total assets reported in COMPUSTAT. Firm size served as a moderator of the relationship 
between exploration/exploitation and firm performance. I did not use the number of employees 
given that the industries are relatively not labor intensive. However, robustness tests using the 
alternative measure (i.e., the number of employees) produced consistent results. 
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 Firm performance (ROA t+1). The dependent variable was measured as the ratio of net 
income to total assets (ROA). ROA is commonly used in current literature as an objective 
measure of organizational profitability or economic performance (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004; Lin et 
al., 2009). The dependent variable was lagged one year after all independent variables and 
control variables to allow time for the possible effects to take place.  
 Control variables. I controlled for industry-specific and firm-specific factors that might 
influence their inclination to engage in exploration and exploitation alliances.  
 Market uncertainty. The control variable, market uncertainty, captures the industry level 
of environmental uncertainty. I used objective measures based on the original work of Tosi, 
Aldag, and Storey (1973), which has been applied frequently in previous studies (e.g., 
Bourgeois, 1985; Folta, 1998; Gohosh & Olsen, 2009; Sasson, 2008). This variable is measured 
by computing the coefficient of variation of sales in the industry. I calculated the volatility of 
sales over five years in several steps, using the following formula:  
                                        Coefficient of Variation =   = √∑
(    ̅)
 
 
 
      ̅⁄                        
Where  
Yi = average sales in year i in this industry; 
  ̅ = average sales over the five year period in this industry. 
 The coefficient of variation of a focal year was calculated based on the five-year period 
prior to this year. First, the industry averages of sales per year over the previous five years were 
computed. Then I calculated the sum of the one-fifth of the squared term of the average sales for 
each year minus the average sales over the five-year period. And the square root of the sum was 
divided by the average sales over the five-year period.  
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 Organizational slack. Previous studies have measured organizational slack in multiple 
ways, including accounting-based financial and non-financial measures (Bradley et al., 2011; 
Daniel et al., 2004; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Tan & Peng, 2003). Reliance on standard financial 
data to measure organizational slack can be traced back to the early work of Bourgeois (1981) 
and has been applied frequently in subsequent slack research (e.g., Bradley et al., 2011; Mishina 
et al., 2004; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Zajac et al., 1991). Organizational financial slack allows 
firms to allocate the spare resources for various uses (Bradley et al., 2011). Along this line of 
research, I measured organizational slack using the following three items: 1) retained earnings, 
2) working capital as a percent of sales, and 3) debt as a percent of equity.  
 Firm performance (ROA t) in the year prior to the measured performance as the 
dependent variable was also included as a controlled variable in order to account for the 
possibility that financial performance might drive exploration or exploitation (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Levinthal & March, 1993), Some alliance-related variables are controlled in 
this study. I controlled for a firm’s prior alliance experience as well as its alliance experience in 
a given year. A firm’s past and current experience in alliances are highly likely to affect its 
capability to effectively manage its exploration or exploitation alliances (Ahuja, 2000; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Tsai, 2001). Therefore, following previous research (Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006), I operationalized past alliance experience as a count of all prior 
alliances formed by a focal firm between 1985 and the preceding year, and current alliance 
experience as the number of alliances formed by a focal firm in the corresponding examined 
year. Similarly, the number of partners a firm has is controlled to control its partnering 
experience. I also controlled for the number of joint ventures and the number of international 
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alliances in order to account for the inherent nature of exploration in these dimensions, given 
that there is a certain level of exploration involved when firms form joint ventures or 
international alliances. To account for industry effects, I included industry dummy variables as 
control variables (i.e., biotechnology, computer software-hardware, telecommunication, 
semiconductor, and electronics). Finally, I controlled for variation within each firm as a random 
effect (using the variable FirmID). 
 
3.4 Analysis and Results 
I analyzed the effects of balancing exploitation and exploration on firm profitability by 
using linear mixed models (LMMs) in STATA 12.0, an extension of generalized linear models 
(Molenberghs & Verbeke, 2006; Pinheiro & Bates, 2000; West, Welch, & Galecki, 2007). 
LMMs produce maximum likelihood estimates from models for fixed and random effects. These 
models are specifically designed to correct for correlations within subjects in multi-level or panel 
data. They have the additional feature of being able to model residual serial correlations as a 
random effect through their random effect or repeating measures features. They have advantages 
over GEE models in that they can handle unbalanced data. This method of analysis is particularly 
suited to the data, since firm-year data is characterized by correlations within firms and the 
number of observations per firm was unbalanced with gaps between years. The estimated models 
can be represented by the following equation: 
ROA i(t+1) = EV it ×β＋ Firm i ＋εit 
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where ROA i(t+1) is the ROA for firm i at time t+1; EV it is a vector of explanatory variables of 
firm i at time t, including function balance, structure balance, temporal function balance, 
temporal structure balance, domain balance, firm size, and control variables; Firm i is a firm 
random effect in the random-effects models; and sit is an error term.  
When the correlation within firms was accounted for by using this method of analysis, 
there appeared to be little residual serial correlation. After the firm was specified as the 'subject’, 
time (year) was introduced as another random effect and then as a repeated measure. When the 
firm variance was accounted for, the random effect intercepts and slope estimates were not 
significant, and introducing time as a repeated measure decreased the model fit. I therefore 
concluded that serial correlations were not significant in this dataset after controlling for firm 
variance using LMM. Also note that all models were carefully diagnosed for multicollinearity. 
The variance inflation factor value for each variable did not exceed four, which is far below the 
recommended limit of 10 (Chatterjee & Price, 1991). Therefore multicollinearity shall not be a 
concern in this study. I included the control variables and explanatory variables to test the 
different hypotheses in multiple models step by step. When necessary, the variables were mean-
centered to generate their interaction terms. The descriptive statistics and correlations of the 
variables are provided in Table 4. Table 4 reveals generally low correlations among the 
independent variables. The mean values of the independent variables indicate tendencies toward 
function exploration/exploitation imbalance (y = 0.80) and structure exploration/exploitation 
imbalance (y = 0.97). Firms tend to maintain a relative balance between function/structure 
exploration and exploitation temporally (y = 0.48/0.42). 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
                  
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1.   ROA t+1 -.07 .52                    
2.   Biotech .36 .48 -.10                   
3.  Computer .43 .49 .05 -.05                  
4.   Semicon .14 .34 .07 -.02 -.09                 
5.   Telecom .24 .43 .08 -.04 -.08 -.04                
6.   Electronics .01 .11 .02 -.06 -.03 .03 -.01               
7.   Alliance Experience 10.59 31.87 .09 .00 .19 .13 .21 .00              
8.   No. of Alliances t 2.01 3.65 .07 .01 .20 .17 .24 .03 .61             
9.   No. of Intl Alliances t .11 .43 .02 .08 .00 .12 .10 .02 .18 .48            
10.  No. of JVs t .27 .72 .06 -.08 .05 .19 .26 .09 .27 .66 .35           
11.  No. of Partners 4.61 8.88 .07 -.02 .20 .18 .27 .04 .58 .98 .48 .69          
12.  ROA t -.06 .45 .55 -.12 .07 .08 .10 .02 .09 .09 .01 .07 .09         
13.  Firm Size t 6.84 2.85 .34 -.13 .09 .06 .31 .08 .32 .24 .05 .22 .25 .42        
14.  Organizational Slack t -.01 .54 .01 .16 -.07 -.00 -.00 .03 .07 .09 .03 .09 .09 .05 .18       
15.  Market Uncertainty t .12 .07 .04 -.33 .22 .16 .11 -.00 .05 .04 -.08 .01 .47 .06 .13 -.06      
16.  Function Balance (FunB) .80 .36 .07 -.05 .24 .01 .19 -.00 .01 -.00 -.11 .05 .01 .07 .08 -.08 .24     
17.  Structure Balance (StrB) .97 .12 -.04 .01 -.13 -.15 -.13 -.03 .31 -.25 -.08 -.15 -.24 -.04 -.17 -.05 -.03 .03    
18. Temporal FunB (TemFun) .48 47 -.07 .04 -.14 .00 -.06 -.00 .18 -.15 -.03 -.05 -.15 -.06 -.26 -.06 -.03 .10 .10   
19. Temporal StrB (TemStr) .42 .48 -.07 -.06 -.06 .00 -.00 -.01 .16 -.11 -.06 -.02 -.01 -.08 -.34 -.07 .07 .08 -.05 .57  
20. Domain Balance .34 .21 .06 -.62 .39 .07 .26 .03 .01 .04 -.07 .09 .05 .08 .06 -.14 .25 .66 .08 .05 .07 
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Table 5  Mixed Models for Firm Performance t+1 
Predictor Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Biotech -.03 -.01 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.02 
Computer .00 .01 -.00 .00 .00 -.00 -.00 
Semicon .02 .03 .02 .02 .03 .02 .02 
Telecom -.00 -.00 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.00 
Electronics .00 .01 -.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Alliance Experience -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 
Alliance this year .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
No of Intl Alliances -.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
No of JVs .01 .01 .01 .00 .00 .01 .01 
No of Partners -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 
Performance t .45*** .45*** .45*** .45*** .45*** .45*** .45*** 
Firm Size .03*** .02*** .02*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .02*** 
Organizational Slack -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 
Market Uncertainty -.10 -.12 -.13 -.13 -.10 -.10 -.12 
Function Balance (FunB)  .05* .03     
Structure Balance (StrB)  .03 .06     
FunB  x  Size   -.03***     
StrB  x  Size   -.01     
Temporal FunB (TemFun)    -.01 .00   
Temporal StrB (TemStr)    .04* .03   
TemFun  x  Size     .01   
TemStr  x  Size     -.02*   
Domain Balance (DB)      .06 .05 
DB  x  Size       -.02* 
        
Random Effect (firm ID) -1.19*** -1.18*** -1.17*** -1.18*** -1.19*** -1.18*** -1.17*** 
-2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
-768.58 -766.38 -759.05 -766.16 -764.08 -767.62 -764.94 
Dependent variable:  Firm Performance (ROA_ t+1) 
 † p < .10 level  **p < .01 level 
 *  p < .05 level   ***p < .001 level
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To test the hypotheses, I first included all control variables in Model 1. Model 2 included 
two more variables, function balance and structure balance, testing Hypothesis 1. The interaction 
terms of function/structure balance and firm size were entered in Model 3 which tests Hypothesis 
4. Model 4 included all control variables and temporal function balance as well as temporal 
structure balance to test Hypothesis 2. To test Hypothesis 5, the interaction terms between 
temporal balances and firm size were added in Model 5. Finally, domain balance and control 
variables were entered in Model 6 for testing Hypothesis 3, and Model 7 included its interaction 
term with firm size for testing Hypothesis 6.  
As can be seen from Model 2 in Table 5, the coefficient of function balance is 0.05 (p < 
0.05), and that of structure balance is 0.03 but not significant. Therefore, the variable function 
balance is positively and significantly related to firm performance, whereas the variable structure 
balance does not have significant impact. It shows that when a firm’s alliance portfolio 
dominantly focuses on product exploration or product exploitation at certain point of time, its 
performance tends to increase. Thus Hypothesis 1 is partially supported such that a focused 
strategy on function alliance formation at one static point of time tends to benefit firm 
performance. Model 3 shows the moderating effect of firm size. The coefficient of the interaction 
between function balance and firm size is negative and significant (b = -0.03, p<0.01), whereas 
that of the interaction between structure balance and firm size is not significant. Figure 3 presents 
a visualization of the interaction effect. From Figure 3A we can see that, when firm size is 
smaller, a product-focused alliance formation decision tends to benefit the firm to a greater 
extent, structure alliance formation does not have significant impact. The finding lends partial 
support to Hypothesis 4. In Model 4, the coefficient of temporal function balance is not 
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significant, while that of temporal structure balance is positive and significant (b = 0.04, p<0.05).  
This result shows that temporal balance of structure exploration and exploitation is positively 
and significantly related to firm performance, suggesting that a firm can benefit from focus on 
structure exploration at one time and structure exploitation at the other, partially supporting 
Hypothesis 2. In Model 5, the coefficient of the interaction between temporal function balance 
and firm size is not significant. In contrast, the interaction between temporal structure balance 
and firm size is negative and significant (b = -0.02, p<0.05), showing a significant moderating 
effect of firm size. From Figure 3B, we can see that the benefit of temporal structure balance is 
intensified when a firm’s size is smaller. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is partially supported along the 
structure domain. In Model 6, the effect of cross-domain balance is not significant; therefore 
Hypothesis 3 does not receive empirical support. However, Model 7 shows a significant 
moderating effect of firm size on the relationship between cross-domain balance and firm 
performance, with the coefficient equals -0.02 (p<0.05). Figure 3C more clearly shows that a 
small firm benefits significantly more from balancing between exploration and exploitation 
across function and structure domains when making alliance formation decision. Thus 
Hypothesis 6 is supported.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
Low Functional Balance High Functional Balance
F
ir
m
 P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 
A. Moderating Effects of Firm Size on Functional Balance 
Low Firm Size
High Firm Size
Figure 3 Moderating Effects of Firm Size 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low Temporal Structure Balance High Temporal Structure Balance
F
ir
m
 P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 
B. Moderating Effects of Firm Size on Temporal Structure 
Balance 
Low Firm Size
High Firm Size
117 
 
  
3.5 Discussion 
There has been a significant amount of work in the existing literature devoted to the 
examination of the tension between exploration and exploitation, as well as the approaches to 
resolve this tension for firms’ survival and longevity. Nevertheless, it is still not clearly 
understood that how firms can achieve ambidexterity and a lasting balance between exploration 
and exploitation (Cantarello et al., 2012). Scholars have acknowledged that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to specify a precise mix of an optimal balance (Levinthal & March, 1993). Perhaps 
there is no need for such a specification, since a precise mix for one firm is very likely not a 
good prescription for another. However, it is worthwhile to investigate the mechanisms and 
influencing factors that could lead to a better understanding of how to achieve such a balance. 
This study thus attempts to join this stream of research endeavor. Seeking to learn from an 
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ambidextrous perspective, in this study, I found support for the ambidextrous arguments made by 
previous scholars. It is generally suggested that an ambidexterity of both exploitation and 
exploration is critical for short-term and long-term performance. The overall findings in this 
study suggest that engaging in both exploration and exploitation activities may enable firms to 
secure a good performance. However, firms need specific tactics to achieve an effective 
ambidexterity. Simply carrying out both activities at the same time does not automatically 
translate into higher performance. I found that at one static point of time, firms tend to be better 
off when they focus on either product exploration alliances or product exploitation alliances (the 
function domain) as opposed to simultaneously pursing two streams. Through examining other 
approaches of ambidexterity, the findings suggest that, to achieve ambidexterity, firms can 
sequentially shift between developing exploration alliance and exploitation alliance activities 
over time. A temporal balance within the structure domain between exploration alliance and 
exploitation alliance will benefit firm performance. In other words, firms benefit from focusing 
on working with existing and familiar partners at one time then on developing new partnering 
relationships for variety and novelty at another time. In addition, I examined the impact of a 
contingent condition, firm size, on the performance implication of ambidexterity. The findings 
indicate that it is particularly important for smaller firms to find the optimal approaches in order 
to effectively manage ambidexterity. Without a munificent context, smaller firms tend to be 
better off if they adopt a focused approach when it comes to exploration or exploitation alliance 
formation along the value chain, or temporally balance exploration and exploitation partnering 
experience. Although the main effect of a domain balance is not empirically supported, it is 
found that smaller firms can better benefit from ambidexterity by carrying out exploration and 
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exploitation pursuits across different domains. It is beneficial for a small firm to form 
exploration alliances or exploitation alliances within the function domain by exploiting existing 
partnering relationships or exploring new partnership (i.e., the structure domain). 
I believe this study has made several contributions to the ambidexterity literature in 
general and ambidexterity in the context of strategic alliance in particular. First, generally 
speaking, the results acknowledge the significance of tension existing between exploration and 
exploitation, which has been a long-held theoretical lens. It resonates with previous research that 
effective management of the tension between exploration and exploitation is critical for firms to 
achieve longevity. The large amount of research embracing this theoretical lens proves a solid 
existence of tension. Ambidexterity in strategic alliances is not an exception. Since that there has 
been limited amount of research examining ambidexterity in the context of strategic alliances, 
this study adds insights to enrich the realm of alliance ambidexterity. To better manage 
exploration and exploitation alliances, firms need to give weight to the tradition wisdom that the 
tension between them needs to be effectively accounted for.  The results shows that at certain 
point of time, it is better for firms to adopt a focused strategy within domain to either focus on 
forming exploration alliances at upstream of the value chain or exploitation alliances at 
downstream of the value chain to avoid such tensions as resource allocation trade-offs or 
conflicting routines. This finding is consistent with previous empirical results that are suggestive 
of a positive impact of a focused approach on firm performance (Lavie et al., 2011; Lin et al., 
2007). There has been a scarcity of research investigating the balance of exploration alliances 
and exploitation alliances and its impact on firm performance. Existing studies (Lavie et al., 
2011; Lin et al., 2007) lend support to the benefits of a focused approach, however, within the 
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structure domain. Their findings suggest that simultaneously investment in seeking new partners 
and renewing existing alliance relationships diminishes a firm’s market value and net profit. My 
finding suggests that, within the function domain, simultaneous pursuit of product exploration 
alliances and exploitation alliances tends to harm firm performance as well. A firm that adopts a 
focused approach (an unbalanced combination) in either type of alliances at certain point of time 
would expect better performance. To some extent, my findings enrich the subject of balancing 
exploration and exploitation in alliances by providing stronger evidence that a simultaneous 
pursuit of both activities is likely not a wise strategic choice.  
Second, this study advances our understanding of how to achieve ambidexterity in 
alliance formation. Despite that the findings suggest a focused approach within domains at a 
certain point of time, firms can make use of other approaches to manage ambidexterity when 
forming alliances. This study examines two approaches to circumvent the inherent tension: 
temporal balance and domain balance. A temporal balance approach advocates that firms 
sequentially balance exploration and exploitation over time (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Lavie et 
al., 2010; Piao, 2010; Simsek et al., 2009). Although temporal balance has been proposed as a 
viable solution in theory, empirical studies devoted to this line of query has been scant. The 
limited amount of existing research (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Piao, 2010) provides supporting 
evidence that balancing exploration and exploitation into different time horizons promotes 
longevity. My findings supply consistent evidence to the positive impact of temporal balance on 
firm performance, while adding insights to the alliance literature in this regard. To the best of my 
knowledge, this study is among the first ones to investigate a temporal balance between 
exploration alliances and exploitation alliances. Lavie et al. (2006) found that the behavior of 
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gradual adjustment of tendencies towards exploration or exploitation alliances occurs over time, 
without examining its performance implications. This study extends the temporal balance 
approach and its impact on performance to the alliance literature. My findings suggest that when 
firms make alliance formation decisions, it is beneficial to temporally balance exploiting existing 
partnering relationships and exploring new partners. Tactically modulating between exploration 
and exploitation in alliance formation over time should be considered by firms to enhance 
viability. Furthermore, this research studies another recently proposed approach, domain 
separation (Lavie et al., 2011; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). Lavie and his colleagues’ research 
supports the merits of balance across domains in alliance formation, whereas this study does not 
find a significant relationship, although the impact of balance across function and structure 
domains tends to be positive. However, the contingency effect is found to be significant such that 
for smaller firms, balancing across domains is beneficial. As a newly proposed approach, across-
domain balance is worthy of further examinations.  
Third, the findings echo the importance of contingent conditions in the ambidexterity 
research (Lin et al., 2007). Organizational characteristics may play an important role in 
explaining the performance implications of ambidexterity. The findings in this study demonstrate 
that the impediments associated with balance within domains and the merits associated with 
temporal balance and across domain balance exacerbate with firm size. These findings are 
consistent with the majority of prior research (e.g., Beckman et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2007). 
Overall, this study demonstrates that it is particularly important for smaller firms to circumvent 
such tensions. Smaller firms are suggested to make the best use of their limited resource 
endowment by adopting a focused strategy at certain point of time, a temporal balance approach, 
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and/or an across domain balance approach when managing their alliance portfolios. As a firm 
accumulates assets, it becomes less resource constrained. It is therefore more important for 
resource-lean firms to manage the tensions. The findings depart from the preliminary findings of 
a couple of prior studies (i.e., Cao et al., 2009; Lavie et al., 2011) that suggest smaller firms tend 
to be better off when they balance exploration and exploitation within domains or across 
domains, compared to larger firms. Built on a different logic of reasoning, they argue that 
smaller firms are more susceptible to the risks of over-commitment on either exploration or 
exploitation, hence in higher need to maintain a balance (Cao et al., 2009); or as a firm grows, it 
may lose its flexibility and ability to reconcile the conflicting routines (Lavie et al., 2011). In 
contrast, my findings of the contingent condition (firm size) accentuate the logic of tension 
between exploration and exploitation, on which the main hypotheses in this study were built, 
which is also consistent with the logic of hypotheses in the study of Lavie et al. (2011). This 
study thus provides different insights to current research. It is likely that the influence of 
contingent condition hinges on specific context characteristics, which in turn indicates the 
complexity of this subject and the importance of more thorough research in this field.  
The performance implications of balancing exploration and exploitation alliances provide 
important insights for practices. The results demonstrate that a firm does not benefit from 
simultaneously engaging its alliances in generating new knowledge and leveraging existing 
knowledge. Striving to balance exploration and exploitation within a single domain may actually 
hurt a firm’s performance, although conventional wisdom suggests such a balance. For example, 
if a firm tries to invest in both exploration alliances and exploitation alliances at the same time, 
the benefits of ambidexterity may be offset by the trade-offs and conflicts incurred. It may not be 
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able to leverage its specialty and expertise and end up with being stuck in the middle. However, 
financial performance improves when a firm explores in one domain while exploiting in another. 
For example, it can form R&D alliances with “old buddies” to effectively co-develop new 
products while relying on established partnering heuristics and routines. Or it can extend its 
market channels by collaborating with new partners for marketing and commercialization 
endeavors. The results are of particular practical importance for smaller firms. Although they are 
resource constrained, smaller firms can still reap the merits of ambidexterity by strategically 
managing its alliance portfolios. The key to successfully managing this is to effectively manage 
the tension by focusing on one type of alliances at a time, temporally shifting between 
exploration alliances and exploitation alliances, or balancing exploration and exploitation 
alliances across domains.  
 Finally, without exception, this study incurs boundary conditions and leaves room for 
future research.  First, this study is set in the context of strategic alliance formation.  The findings 
provide insights to the alliance literature, however, should be cautiously interpreted when 
extended to other settings. The function and structure domains of strategic alliances have been 
examined in this study. Future research may look into other domains to enrich our understanding 
of ambidexterity in alliances (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). In addition, future research may extend 
the logic of across domain balance to intra-organizational context by considering corresponding 
domains within organizational boundaries to see how across-domain balance would facilitate 
ambidexterity within organizations (Lavie et al., 2011). Second, I examined the approach of 
temporal balance and its performance implications. Previous research calls for more attention on 
a temporal perspective in organizational ambidexterity research to explore its dynamic nature 
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(Boumgarden et al., 2012; Piao, 2010). However, it is acknowledged that there are challenges of 
large-scale empirical examination of this phenomenon. This study looks at the shifts between 
exploration and exploitation alliances by checking whether a firm’s emphasis on one type of 
activity in a given year had changed, compared to the preceding year in which alliances were 
formed. Identifying and operationalizing the temporal shifts or episodes need more future 
research efforts which may require detailed case studies and a variety of methods to capture 
change (Boumgarden et al., 2012). Third, I examined the contingent effect of firm size on 
balancing exploration and exploitation alliances. The results depart from some prior research 
(e.g., Cao et al., 2009; Lavie et al., 2011),  but resonate with other previous studies (e.g., 
Beckman et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2007). Future research may examine its contingent effect in 
other contexts to provide more insights into this subject. Besides, other contingent conditions 
such as environmental uncertainty may be investigated to uncover more underlying mechanisms 
that may influence the benefits of balancing exploration and exploitation within and across 
domains. Fourth, overall, my study supports the tension view of exploration and exploitation, 
which has been the long tradition of research in this area. As powerful as the tension view is, 
recent research has started to explore other theoretical lens, such as the paradox view, the 
complementarity view and the synergy view (Piao, 2010; Smith & Tushman, 2005). Future 
research may look into the variety of theoretical lenses and explore the interplay between 
multiple balancing approaches to enhance our understanding of this phenomenon.  
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4. Conclusion 
 Research interest in the exploration-exploitation framework has grown significantly in 
the past two decades, and the application of this framework in strategic alliances has been 
increasing in recent years. Although much progress has been made in multiple disciplines, many 
open questions remain that merit further attention (Lavie et al., 2010). In this dissertation, I 
reviewed the current literature, and examined various facets of this framework in the context of 
strategic alliances. I focused on discussing the antecedents and consequences of exploration and 
exploitation alliances and the balance between them. In particular, I examined how 
environmental force (i.e., market uncertainty) and organizational features including innovative 
capacity, and slack resources, as well as their interactions, drive organizations towards 
exploration alliance formation or exploitation alliance formation. I also investigated the 
performance outcome of balancing exploration and exploitation alliances, by examining the 
balance versus focus perspective, the temporal separation approach, and the domain separation 
approach. A contingent condition, firm size, was included in the examination of the relationship 
between balancing exploration-exploitation and firm performance. Hypotheses were proposed to 
test these facets and the results of the hypotheses are presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6 Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis Prediction Result 
Chapter 2: Antecedents of exploration-exploitation alliances 
H1 
Firms with higher levels of innovative capacity are more likely to form 
exploitation alliances than exploration alliances. 
Supported 
H2 
Firms with higher levels of organizational slack are more likely to form 
exploration alliances than exploitation alliances. 
Supported 
H3 
At higher levels of market uncertainty, firms are less likely to form 
either exploration or exploitation alliances. 
Supported 
H4 
Firms with higher innovative capacity tend to be more willing to form 
exploration and exploitation alliances in uncertain markets. 
Supported 
H5 
Firms with more slack resources tend to be more willing to form 
exploration and exploitation alliances in uncertain markets. 
Effect on exploitation alliances 
supported; reverse effect on 
exploration alliances. 
Chapter 3: Consequences of exploration-exploitation alliances 
H1 
At one static point of time, performance is likely to increase when a firm 
focuses on either exploration alliances or exploitation alliances. 
Function domain supported 
Structure domain not significant 
H2 
Over time, firm performance is likely to increase when a firm balances 
exploration and exploitation of alliance formation decisions temporally. 
Function domain not significant 
Structure domain supported 
H3 
At one static point of time, a firm is likely to increase its performance 
when it balances exploration and exploitation across the function-based 
and structure-based domains of alliance formation decisions. 
Not significant 
H4 
At one static point of time, firm size affects the performance implication 
of exploitation-exploration balance such that it is more beneficial for a 
small firm to focus on either exploration alliances or exploitation 
alliances. 
Function domain supported 
Structure domain not significant 
H5 
Over time, firm size affects the performance implication of temporal 
exploitation-exploration balance such that it is more beneficial for a 
small firm to balance exploration and exploitation of alliance formation 
decisions temporally. 
Function domain not significant 
Structure domain supported 
H6 
At one static point of time, firm size affects the performance implication 
of exploitation-exploration balance across domains such that it is more 
beneficial for a small firm to balance exploration and exploitation across 
the function-based and structure-based domains of alliance formation 
decisions. 
Supported 
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 On the aggregate, my findings confirm that exploration and exploitation are in tension. 
Triggers of exploration versus exploitation tend to steer organizations toward them in different 
ways. I find that a firm’s strategic choice between exploration alliances versus exploitation 
alliances is a reflection of both organizational intention as well as an adaption to environmental 
turbulence. Both ‘Me’ and the ‘Industry’ together craft strategic choices. In particular, firms with 
higher innovative capacity form more exploitation alliances and less exploration alliances; those 
with more slack resources form more exploration alliances and less exploitation alliances. Under 
market uncertainty, firms tend to be risk adverse and reduce the formation of both types of 
alliances. Furthermore, firms with higher innovative capacity and more slack resources generally 
mitigate the negative impact of market uncertainty on alliance formation. The tension also exists 
when exploration versus exploitation affect performance outcome. My findings suggest that 
balancing them simultaneously may hurt performance. Instead, balance can be executed via 
temporal separation, or domain separation, which is particularly important for smaller firms. 
Interestingly, my findings tend to show that a focused strategy worked particularly in the 
function domain of exploration-exploitation, whereas the temporal approach fits the structure 
domain of exploration-exploitation. It would be intriguing to further investigate the interaction of 
multiple approaches. Organizational ambidexterity does benefit firm performance, given that it is 
achieved tactically.  
 Inconsistent conclusions have been drawn regarding the antecedents of exploration and 
exploitation, and few studies have demonstrated how balance between exploration and 
exploitation generates favorable outcomes. I have examined both the antecedents and 
consequences of this framework in the context of strategic alliances, in hope of contributing to a 
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more coherent and complete body of work on this phenomenon. More research is encouraged to 
sort out and refine the fundamental terms and concepts of exploration-exploitation, and to further 
improve our understanding of their determinants and effects. 
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